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ABSTRACT

As the People’s Republic of China has modernized, it has become increasingly reliant on
Middle Eastern oil to fuel its economy. But economics did not always play a primary role in
China’s Middle East policy. This thesis seeks to answer the questions: what have been the
drivers of the PRC’s foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region – and what historical, political,
and economic circumstances caused them to evolve at such a rapid pace? In analyzing
Chinese foreign policy in Iraq over three chronological periods – the Cold War Period (19581979), the Transition Period (1980-1988), and the Post-Cold War Period (1989-present) –
this thesis finds that China has always had an interest in regional stability. However, the
definition of “stability” has differed during each period, reflecting a general trend away from
ideological and political considerations and toward a focus on economic interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
PROLOGUE
Even though China’s Middle East presence has been confined to the past sixty years,
the arc of China’s regional foreign policy has witnessed a complete about-face. During the
1960s, China attempted to export its revolutionary ideology abroad, supporting revolutionary
insurrections in Algeria, Palestine, Oman, and Yemen. 1 By the 2000s, however, China had
established a resolute posture of noninterference and registered its disapproval of Western
efforts to enforce regime change in the Middle East. What, then, have been the drivers of the
PRC’s foreign policy in the Middle East – and more importantly, what historical, political,
and economic circumstances caused them to evolve at such a rapid pace?
The People’s Republic of China made its debut to the Middle East in 1955. The
Asian-African Bandung Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, hosted delegates from
twenty-nine mostly Third World countries, including the People’s Republic of China and the
Kingdom of Iraq. Many Western scholars at the time anxiously interpreted the event as a
sounding board for the Third World’s grievances against colonialism, racism, and
imperialism perpetrated by the West. 2 Their suspicion was not unwarranted. Even though the
express purpose was to promote economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and
international peace, the conference is also remembered for engendering the “Bandung spirit,”
a shared global struggle against imperialism and colonialism. 3

1

Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” in China, the
Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, ed. Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu. (Boulder: Lyne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), 156-176.
2
Saunders Redding, "The Meaning of Bandung," The American Scholar, 25. no. 4 (1956): 414.
3
"The Bandung Conference of 1955," China Daily, April 20, 2005.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/20/content_435929.htm (accessed January 6, 2013).
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The Bandung Conference reflected the complexities of a world reeling from the
legacy of colonialism and embroiled in the midst of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. At the time,
the relationship between China and the United States was particularly strained. Not only did
Chinese leaders perceive America as the avatar of imperialism and the foe of communist
countries worldwide – but to make matters worse, en route to the Bandung Conference,
Premier Zhou Enlai narrowly escaped an assassination attempt that the Chinese blamed on
the KMT and the CIA. 4 Nevertheless, Zhou took great pains to appear cool and collected
before the conference’s delegates. There already existed among the attendees a stigma
against communism as dictatorial and neo-colonial in its own right. Zhou did his best to head
off their concerns and delivered a speech in which he propounded:
There exists common ground among the Asian and African countries, the basis of which
is that the overwhelming Asian and African countries and their peoples have suffered and
are still suffering from the calamities of colonialism. All the Asian and African countries
gained their independence from colonialist rule whether these countries are led by the
communist or nationalists. We should seek to understand each other and respect each
other, sympathize with and support one another. 5

In the true Bandung Spirit, Zhou attempted to reach out to fellow nations who had been the
victims of colonial and imperial aggression. This was the first opportunity that China had to
engage with other members of the Third World in so public a forum. In doing so, China laid
down the framework for its eventual relationships with countries in the Middle East-North
Africa (MENA) region. Indeed, the year after the conference, Yemen, Egypt, and Syria

4

Wendell L. Minnick, "Target: Zhou Enlai—Was America’s CIA Working With Taiwan Agents to Kill
Chinese Premier?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 158 (1995): 54-55.
5
“The Bandung Conference of 1955,” 2005.
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formally recognized and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, while Egypt became
the first Arab recipient of Chinese foreign aid. 6
One of the Bandung Conference’s most significant achievements was the passing of
the “Ten Principles of Peace.” Based off the 1954 Sino-Indian declaration of “Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence,” the agreement emphasized a consistent message of respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, and noninterference in other’s internal
affairs. 7 This message would become the rhetorical focal point of China’s Middle East policy
for the next half century. It bears curious resemblance to contemporary China’s doctrine of
noninterference in the affairs of other countries: the PRC’s reluctance to approve multilateral
military action in Libya and Syria during 2011 and 2012, respectively, are but two examples.
Yet it would be misleading to assume that China has always embraced a steadfast policy of
nonintervention in the Gulf. In fact, this policy is a recent phenomenon that began to emerge
following the end of the Cold War, and it is only in the past decade that China has gained the
confidence to assert its opinions so vehemently on the world stage.
Iraq was considered the Gulf’s most important state until the more recent ascendency
of Saudi Arabia following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Not
surprisingly, Beijing has enjoyed a particularly deep and nuanced relationship with Baghdad
since the Bandung Conference. As China’s long-standing relationship with Iraq has spanned
the gamut of political, military, and economic cooperation throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century, I submit that Iraq is heuristically representative of Chinese policy in the
region. Just as importantly, the Sino-Iraqi bilateral relationship has encompassed many
6

Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-75: Three Case Studies, (London:
Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1981), 4.
7
Sally Percival Wood, "‘Chou Gags Critics in Bandoeng: How the media framed Premier Zhou Enlai at
the Bandung Conference, 1955." Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (2009): 20.
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different phases: direct partnership and antagonism, calculated neutrality, and strategic
friendship – perfectly modeling the progression of China’s Middle East policy over time.
Despite Iraq’s obvious importance to the development of Chinese regional policy and to
China’s own domestic modernization, there is little scholarship devoted solely to the
evolution of this bilateral relationship. Thus, my thesis seeks to bridge a gap in the body of
academic work regarding Chinese-Middle Eastern relations by undertaking a full-scale study
of the Sino-Iraqi relationship after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
As an ascendant nation, China’s primary interest today is maintaining steady
economic growth that can only be achieved through regional stability and carefully
manicured relations with Persian Gulf countries. I hope that my contribution will be valuable
to the community of China-watching scholars, that it might help to illuminate some of the
motivations and rationales behind China’s actions in this region. I hope that it may offer
some insight as to future directions in Chinese-Gulf relations, but particularly in situations
where China’s cooperation with the world community clearly militates against its own
strategic interests, even as it is critical for its reputation as a “responsible stakeholder.”
BACKGROUND: TWO SCHOLARS, TWO SCHOOLS
Two schools of thought are at the forefront of theorizing Chinese foreign policy in the
Middle East. One theory, proposed by John Calabrese, contends that China’s Middle East
policy has always been couched as a factor of its relationships with the world superpowers,
the United States and Russia. Other scholarship chronicles Chinese Middle East policy as a
string of related, but evolving, phases that reflect China’s internal needs. 8

8

Many scholars discuss Chinese policy within the entire Middle East-North Africa region. My study,
however, confines itself to the Gulf region, as superpower attention and activity has traditionally
been geographically trained on this zone.

From Beijing to Baghdad | 8

Superpower Super-centrism
Authors such as John Calabrese stress the centrality of the United States and the
Soviet Union (and now Russia) as constants in Chinese foreign policy decision-making. For
Calabrese, China’s Middle East policy reflects the changes and shifts in Chinese foreign
policy as a whole. Indigenous conflicts in the region have been ancillary at best, while
China’s reaction to global events dominated by superpowers have been the principal
determinant of China’s actions in the Middle East. 9 In his book China’s Changing Relations
with the Middle East, Calabrese traces China’s decision calculus through three stages.
The first period from 1950-1965, which he entitles “Probing without progress,” is
characterized by “rapid socialist economic transformation…within a context of mutual
suspicion, reciprocal provocation and generally implacable enmity between the United States
and the Soviet Union.” 10 Following just off the heels of the Maoist revolution, the early
People’s Republic of the 50s through 60s was possessed by the fervor of anti-imperialism
and anti-colonialism. This zeitgeist inspired Chinese policymakers to initially view the
United States as the greatest perpetrator of these sins. Thus, from 1950-1957, China loyally
committed to an alliance with the Soviet Union while orienting itself to combat the creeping
specter of American imperialism. Over time, however, the relationship between Moscow and
Beijing grew frosty as differences in Chinese and Russian ideology grew apparent. Beijing
and Moscow began to contend for the mantle of leadership of the communist front and Third
World organizations. Perhaps more specific to this study, Mao Zedong was displeased by
Nikita Khrushchev’s embrace of Peaceful Coexistence and reluctance to directly challenge
the United States on a military basis. Eventually, Beijing’s deep insecurity and seething
9

John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East (London: Pinter, 1991), 10.
Ibid., 7.

10
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resentment of the Soviets led to China’s reassessment of the Soviet Union as the greatest
threat to regional and global stability. Beijing thus began to view the Middle East as a crucial
theatre of Sino-Soviet rivalry. 11 China’s policy was geared toward neutralizing the Soviet
Union’s regional influence.
Calabrese labels 1966-1977 a period of “Paralysis to Pragmatism.” This period was
coincident with the Cultural Revolution and witnessed an intensification of China’s hostility
toward the two superpowers. Championing itself as the true standard-bearer of MarxismLeninism, China began supporting revolutionary movements and communist parties
throughout the region, most notably rebels in South Yemen, Oman, and Palestinian lands, as
well as communist factions in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. The end goal of supporting these
liberation movements was to promote China’s brand of communism and especially to subvert
Soviet revisionism and its threat to world revolution and regional stability. 12 By this point,
relations with the Soviet Union had reached rock bottom, and by the mid-70s, China had
allied itself with the United States after coming to view the USSR as its primary enemy.
America began escalate its presence in the Persian Gulf in response to Great Britain’s
declining presence and as a means of precluding increasing Soviet influence. This supplied
Beijing with an opportunity to pursue bilateral ties with Gulf regimes.
Calabrese’s third period, from 1978-1989, is labeled one of “Anti-Hegemonism to
Modernisation.” Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, modernization became the guiding
principle of Chinese foreign relations. Just as China focused on promoting modernization, it
also had to protect its interests. Thus, economic and strategic incentives were tightly linked,
and protecting continued modernization required stopping the USSR’s continued incursion
11

Ibid., 34.
Hafizullah Emadi, China's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East (Saddar Karachi: Royal Book
Company, 1997).
12
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into the Middle East. 13 China began looking to the region as a market for weapons and
potential exports. It also viewed the region as a source of diverse raw materials. By the end
of the 80s, China’s foreign policy had detached itself from its ideological and Cold War
underpinnings and now placed a primary emphasis on economic cooperation.
Unfortunately, Calabrese’s book was published in 1991 and ends there. Since that
time, China has made vast strides with respect to its diplomatic, economic, and political
relationships in the region. One downside of Calabrese’s framework is that it fails to account
for foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union. And while his analysis of Chinese
foreign policy as responsive to superpower politics is compelling within the context of the
Cold War, it is necessary to draw on other theories to fully contextualize China’s Middle
East policy in the Post-Cold War era.
Progression and Evolution
Yitzhak Shichor offers a different approach in his analysis of Chinese Middle East
policy. Instead, he breaks it up into a logical progression encompassing three distinct eras;
one in the Maoist era and two in the post-Maoist era. While taking Calabrese’s theory of
superpower influence into account, Shichor’s theory is broader and hesitant to center the
whole of China’s Middle East policy around this theme. Shichor first presents the Maoist
period, which was determined primary by inconsistent political factors – a mishmash of
competing political, strategic, security, and ideological considerations that derived from both
internal and external factors. 14 Starting in the 1940s, the Middle East originally served as
China’s strategic buffer against Nazi Germany before becoming a bulwark against Soviet
presence in the 60s. Broadly speaking, China’s foreign policy from the 40s through the 50s
13
14

Calabrese, China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East, 118.
Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” 160.
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reflected Chinese internal politics: fomenting Middle Eastern revolutions reflected Maoist
belief that constant change, revolution, and transformation were integral to the socialist
agenda. 15 During the 1970s, China’s policy still exhibited the fractious nature of domestic
Chinese politics: the learning curve was steep and an internal debate raged within Beijing
about how to utilize its new position of power on the UN Security Council, what
responsibilities it had as an international player, and how to avoid unnecessary entanglement
in political issues tangential to strategic interests. This eventually led to a policy of
abstention and absenteeism, the legacy of which is still apparent today.
While the Maoist stage was governed by political, strategic, security and ideological
considerations, economics and pragmatism reigned supreme during the Post-Mao stage. 16
Shichor divide this stage into two parts: before the 1990s and after. Initially, China regarded
the Middle East and Persian Gulf in particular as a huge market for Chinese goods and
services, particularly labor export and construction contracts. During the late 70s, China
increased its sales of arms and military technology, and the Middle East eventually became
China’s leading arms market by the 80s. Beginning the 1980s, China began to buy small
quantities of crude oil. The role of oil in Chinese regional policy is so important that Shichor
delineates a second Post-Mao phase (post-90s) specifically to account for the rise of China’s
Middle Eastern oil relationships. By the early 2000s, the Greater Middle East had become
China’s principal source of oil imports, accounting for approximately 50-60% of the total. 17
In sum, while China initially considered the Middle East as an arena for mediating its
relationships with the global superpowers, a confluence of Deng Xiaoping’s opening up

15

Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), 159.
16
Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” 161.
17
Ibid.
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policy along with the demise of the Soviet Union transformed Middle East policy to one
predominantly based on economic interests. Almost all literature on the broad trends
governing Chinese Middle East policy ends at the beginning of the First Gulf War. Since
then, most journal articles and literature have tended to cover Chinese reactions to events in
the Middle East on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the question of how best to theorize Chinese
Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era is open for debate. In the Post-Cold War era, the
two most historically prominent factors – China’s wary eye toward the interests of the
superpowers and China’s own nascent economic interests – were pitted once more against
each other in the 1990s and 2000s, most notably in Iraq. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991,
the international community supported the United States’ effort to put an end to Saddam
Hussein’s aggression. China was caught in the unfortunate position of having to weigh its
own economic interests and bilateral relationship with Iraq against the option of deferring to
the United States and the wishes of the world community. What factored into China’s
decision to remain neutral at this point in history, and again during the Second Iraq War? My
hope is that this project will contribute to the field an understanding of the drivers of Chinese
foreign policy in the region, with particular emphasis to identifying a cohesive strategy for
the post-Cold War era.
Although helpful for contextualizing some of the broader trends in Middle East
policy, Calabrese and Shichor’s approaches are due for an update. I submit a paradigm for
organizing Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East that incorporates both Calabrese’s
focus on superpowers and Shichor’s emphasis on internal dynamics, but identifies different
historical turning points and highlights the decision-making challenges that Beijing has faced
when evolving sets of competing interests come into conflict with one another.
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ARGUMENT
As a developing nation, the People’s Republic of China has always been constrained
by its limited resources and influence in the world. Lacking the power to unilaterally mold
political and economic conditions to its own advantage, China’s regional strategy in the
Middle East has been centered on the notion of maintaining regional stability. Exactly what
“stability” has entailed, however, has changed almost decade by decade.
I propose that China’s Middle East policy be organized into three main eras: the Cold
War Period (1958-1979), the Transition Period (1980-1989), and the Post-Cold War Period
(1990-present). Each period reflects a different Chinese understanding of how best to
construe stability, and thus, a different set of priorities. Central to this discussion will be the
role of economic and commercial interests in Chinese policy-making and its elevation from
an auxiliary concern to the primary driver of foreign policy. My focus will be on the
evolution of these eras and the events and ideological shifts that they embodied.
During the Cold War Period (1958-1979), China framed the United States, and later
on, Soviet Union as existential threats. Regional stability in this context meant preventing the
further geographical encroachment of these imperialist powers into the Gulf. China’s primary
focus then was on cultivating good relationships with regional governments as a means of
precluding the expansion of superpower spheres of influence. One way of cultivating strong
political relationships was through increasing trade and economic cooperation. Accordingly,
economics began as a mere means for attaining political goodwill.
The Transition Period (1980-1989) saw China’s economic interests in the region
slowly supplant anti-superpower hedging as the primary factor in China’s regional decisionmaking. This era reflected the continuation and expansion of economic relationships China
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forged for the purposes of hedging against superpowers during the preceding period.
Additionally, China’s policy of opening up under Deng Xiaoping and the downgraded threat
of the Soviet Union forced a reassessment of China’s true interests in the Gulf. The case
study of the Iran-Iraq War shows how the intra-Gulf conflict tested China’s definitions of
regional stability by pitting Cold War considerations against economic ones.
In the Post-Cold War Period (1990-present), China has focused almost exclusively on
pursuing its own economic interests in the region. Regional stability here refers to ensuring,
to the best of China’s limited abilities, the conditions optimal for the free flow of trade and
oil. In contrast to the Cold War Period, stability serves the purpose of securing economic
interests. This strategy, however, is at least partially constrained by China’s need to consider
the interests of the United States and the international community.
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II. THE COLD WAR PERIOD (1958-1979)
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
The first era of China’s Middle East foreign policy is entitled the Cold War Period
because at any given point during this Period, China’s conception of regional stability meant
precluding the expanding influence of one or both of the world’s two Cold War superpowers,
the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this title is apt because the manner in
which China approached this goal was “Cold War” in nature. While the PRC did not directly
or militarily engage with its superpower foes, it treated Middle Eastern nations like political
battlegrounds, vying for political and economic relevance and attempting to supplant the
United States and Soviet Union in influence.
During the early part of the Cold War Period, China viewed the United States as the
main threat to peace in the Middle East and the world. Led by Mao Zedong, China’s
opposition to the United States and its Gulf policies was both ideological and strategic in
nature. China’s understanding of American motivations borrowed heavily from the Leninist
theory that the survival of America’s capitalist economic system required that the country
aggressively expand into the Third World to acquire the resources and foreign markets it
desired. Mao believed that these attempts at neo-colonialism and economic enslavement
“have taken the place of fascist Germany, Italy and Japan and are frantically preparing a new
world war and menacing the whole world.” 18 Responding to the 1956 Suez Crisis, he wrote:
“The great contradiction is with the U.S., not Nasser. The U.S. is trying to maneuver
Britain out of the Middle East, for it harbors sinister designs of taking over the
Middle East…The internal contradictions of imperialism in scrambling for colonies
18

Mao Zedong, Selected Works, 4:284-285.
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are great. We can make use of their contradictions to accomplish our ends. This is
strategy.” 19

Under Mao’s “contradictions” framework, American imperialism from 1958 through the
mid-60s had assumed the mantle of “principal contradiction.” The battle against American
imperialism had become the single most important struggle in the worldwide communist
movement. Only by halting American aggression against the Third World, beginning in the
Gulf, could communism advance to the next level. 20
The “strategy” that Mao spoke of entailed identifying and countering the methods by
which American imperialism took advantage of economically undeveloped nations. In a 1965
speech to the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algiers, Member of the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress Nan Han-chen enumerated a litany of grievances against
American imperialism. He concluded that in pursuing its own interests, the United States
perpetuated forms of political and economic coercion and control largely responsible for the
poverty and backwardness endemic to “Afro-Asian countries.” 21 In summary, these included:
1. Military, economic, and political privileges: Americans enjoyed the establishment
of military bases and stationing of troops, land concessions and extraterritoriality.
2. Control over the branches of production and economic lifelines: The United States
controlled the majority of major indigenous natural resources and raw materials,
including minerals and, notably, oil.

19

Mao Zedong, “Summing Up of Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries Conference” (Article
written during the Conference of the Secretaries of Provincial and Municipal Party Committees, Tsingtao,
July 1957).
20
Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1970), 28.
21
This designation included the Middle East within its borders.
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3. Control over the international market: the United States monopolized and regularly
manipulated world prices, arbitrarily lowering the prices of primary products and raising
the prices of goods sold to Afro-Asian countries.
4. Economic aid: The economic aid provided by the United States was an instrument for
extending control and exploitation over the internal affairs of recipient countries. 22
Although Nan Han-chen refers specifically here to American influence in the Third
World, his comments extend for the most part to the actions of the Soviet Union as well. In
explicitly enumerating these theaters of superpower dominance, Nan Han-chen also laid out a
battle plan by which China would seek to roll back the influence of superpowers in the Gulf.
Since so many of these mechanisms of control were economic in nature, Nan stressed that the
only way for Afro-Asian nations to emancipate themselves from superpower influence was to
achieve economic independence. 23 Spurring along this economic independence was to be
China’s self-proclaimed role during the Cold War period, despite its fairly limited economic
power at the time. As the case of Iraq shows, Chinese policies in the Middle East during the Cold
War Period were concentrated on frustrating to the greatest extent possible these so-called
superpower military and economic privileges, and providing alternative markets and sources of
economic aid. Thus, during the Cold War Period, economic goals were merely a means to the
broader goal of regional stability by preventing an increase in the superpowers’ influence.
During the 1960s, two factors contributed to a temporary reorientation of Chinese policy:
Beijing’s souring relationship with Moscow, and the advent of China’s Cultural Revolution,
which inspired the party leadership to export its revolutionary ideology abroad including to the
22

Nan Han-Chen, “For the Economic Emancipation of Afro-Asian Peoples,” Peking Review 10:5 (March
5, 1965).
23
Not all African and Asian countries suspected American policies of such sinister intent; in fact most
welcomed political and economic assistance from the West. This, however, did not diminish China’s
attempts to persuade them to the contrary.
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Gulf. China believed it faced the twin enemies of American imperialism and Soviet
revisionism, the threat each posed enhanced by their allegedly nefarious collusion in
international affairs.
The Sino-Soviet split was rooted in Mao Zedong’s and Nikita Khrushchev’s divergent
interpretations of Marxism and Khrushchev’s apparent moderation in his stance toward the West
after 1957. 24 While Khrushchev’s regime promoted a theory of peaceful coexistence with
capitalist countries, Mao rejected out of hand even a modicum of detente. Although initially
pleased by the prospect of another red ally in Beijing, Moscow grew alarmed during the 1950s at
what it viewed as Beijing’s increasingly irresponsible and belligerent actions, such as the
Chinese military’s shelling of offshore islands controlled by the government on Taiwan in 1958.
For its part, the Chinese government began to accuse the Soviets of “Marxist revisionism.” Not
only were Moscow’s desperate attempts to ensure peaceful coexistence and avoid nuclear war
imperiling the progress of the communist movement, Beijing argued that the Soviets were
actively scheming with the United States to dominate the world. 25 Public acknowledgement of
Sino-Soviet animosity had been kept to a minimum at first, but it exploded in 1960 when China
criticized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at a meeting of the World Federation of
Trade Unions in Beijing. In response, the Soviet Union withdrew all its scientists and
technicians, jeopardizing China’s industrialization and already faltering economy in the
midst of the disaster caused by Mao’s Great Leap Forward experiment. 26 By the mid-60s, the
CCP openly condemned the Soviet “modern revisionist clique.” Its fears of Soviet hegemony
seemed vindicated when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev
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Doctrine in 1968. After this, the Soviet Union was put on equal footing with the Americans
as a threat to global stability. China would brook neither country’s further encroachment in
the Gulf, and Beijing reoriented its policy accordingly.
On a domestic level, China’s Cultural Revolution exploded in 1966 as an attempt to
reinstate a revolutionary consciousness in the masses. In the foreign policy realm, China’s
Cultural Revolution manifested itself as an active attempt to export revolutionary ideology
abroad, particularly to the Third World, as part of a strategy to ensure global stability by
neutralizing superpower influence. The Chinese viewed the Third World as particularly
susceptible to superpower influence because it relied heavily on superpower economic aid.
But at the same time, the Third World was also seen as a place of vulnerability – a “strategic
rear” where imperialism could be combated with great effectiveness. 27 While America’s
malignant influence in the Gulf was long established, China now had the added task of
countering Soviet hegemony as well. After all, the Middle East had become one of the
principal targets of Soviet foreign policy, as Arab nations had become increasingly
dependent on Soviet political, military, and economic support. 28
Beginning in the late 1960s, China and the United States embarked on a path toward
rapprochement. President Richard Nixon’s willingness to engage with the PRC culminated with
his visit to China in 1972 and the 1972 Shanghai Communique. China believed that the United
States would be a useful ally in balancing against the Soviet Union, which had now definitively
replaced the United States as the primary threat to international stability. By the end of the
1970s, the United States formally established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.
27
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THE SINO-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP
A New Beginning (1958-1960)
Three main themes factored into Sino-Iraqi relationship during the early period of
1958-1960: nationalism, China’s own communist ideology, and anti-imperialism. While
China took an inconsistent stance on the first two, it was unwavering in its pursuit of the
third.
Prior to the Bandung Conference, China classified the Kingdom of Iraq as part of a
capitalist camp controlled by Western imperialism, and hence, not a potential ally in the antiimperialist front. 29 King Faisal III was friendly to the West and had engaged Iraq in a
security alliance with the United States and Great Britain called the Baghdad Pact. Founded
in 1953, the Baghdad Pact’s goal was to contain the USSR by creating a line of strong states
along the Soviets’ southwestern frontier. But on July 14, 1958, the nationalist Iraqi army
general Abd al-Karim Qasim seized power in a military coup, overthrowing the Faisal
monarchy and establishing the Republic of Iraq with himself as the first Prime Minister. The
import of Qasim’s revolution was not lost on the Chinese, for they interpreted his rise to
power as an unprecedented opportunity for China to establish itself in the Arab world. China
extended recognition a mere two days after the revolution. Within ten days it had established
diplomatic relations, sent its first shipment of Chinese goods, and dispatched two New China
News Agency (NCNA, now Xinhua) correspondents to Baghdad. 30
The timing and nature of the revolution could not have been more fortuitous. There
were several reasons why Qasim quickly became the darling of China’s leaders. The Chinese
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hoped that Qasim would prove to be a powerful counterpoint to Gamal Abdel Nasser, the
Egyptian leader who consolidated Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR)
during 1958. China made its political debut in the Gulf just at the peak of the Arab
nationalist movement, which treated communism’s atheism and economic radicalism with
deep suspicion. Much to Beijing’s alarm, Nasser relentlessly persecuted communists in his
the UAR, imprisoning or exiling communists until there were hardly any left. In contrast,
Qasim’s tolerance of the Iraqi Communist Party seemed encouraging. He not only courted
their support, but allowed them significant influence in the Iraqi state apparatus during the
early years of his regime. 31 But China’s support for Qasim was only partially based on his
tolerance for communism. Much more important was his firm stand against American
imperialism. 32 Beyond its reservations about Nasser’s anti-communist leanings, Beijing was
growing apprehensive that Nasser was beginning to show an inclination to cooperate with the
West. 33 Chinese leaders hoped that the momentum of the Iraqi revolution might convince
Nasser to rejoin them on the anti-imperialist front. If not, Qasim could serve as a new
revolutionary leader to challenge Nasser for authority in the Arab world. 34
Careful to frame the newly minted Sino-Iraqi friendship within the context of the
shared crusade against imperialism, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi informed Iraqi
Republic Foreign Minister Abdal-Jabbar Aljamer two days after the 1958 revolution: “I am
deeply convinced that friendship and co-operation between China and Iraq and their peoples
will develop continuously on the basis of the Bandung principles. The Chinese people will
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exert their utmost efforts to support your just struggle against imperialism.” 35 For its part, the
new Iraqi government seemed grateful for China’s support. On July 30, Mohammed Mahdi
Kubbah, Member of the Iraqi Sovereignty Council gushed:
“The Arab people in general and we, the Iraqis, in particular, do not know how to thank
People’s China for their noble and friendly attitudes toward all liberation movements in
the Arab world. This noble attitude is certainly very impressive and important in stopping
the aggressors, because People’s China occupies a very important position among the
nations of the world. Its manpower and material resources are a factor which make the
aggressors think twice before acting.” 36
Important here is Iraq’s tacit approval of and collaboration in the struggle against imperialism.
Indeed, Qasim seemed to vindicate China’s hopes when he withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad
Pact soon thereafter, leaving the Americans, as Beijing noted with amusement, a “Baghdad
Pact with no Baghdad.”
Chinese leaders believed that Iraq’s sudden transformation into an “anti-imperialist
forefront” greatly accelerated the process of total destruction of colonial forces in the Middle
East and in the world. 37 The year 1959 saw the PRC’s attempt to expand its influence in what
it considered its pillar in the Arab world by establishing closer political, cultural, and
economic ties. 38 On April 4, both nations signed the first Sino-Iraqi cultural agreement in
Baghdad. This provided for a wide range of cultural exchange visits by government officials,
professors, students, journalists, language teachers, sports teams, youth organizations, and art
troupes. The Chinese were explicit that this new Sino-Iraqi relationship be rooted “in the
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spirit of the Bandung Conference and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” 39 To
highlight their shared revolutionary heritage, the Chinese arranged for the first Chineselanguage movie screening in Baghdad: Tung Tsun-jui, the story of a young hero during the
Chinese War of Liberation. 40
Beijing was equally eager to engage Baghdad in trade deals. It is important to note,
however, that at this time the Chinese viewed commerce not as an end in itself so much as a
means of active resistance against Western imperialists. Countries like the United States
were believed to intentionally manipulate markets and depress prices in order to keep Third
World economies dependent on the West. Thus, the ultimate goal was to “see the other AsianAfrican countries, as well as ourselves, prosperous, rich, and strong so as to…strengthen the
forces against colonialism and for world peace.” 41 To that end, the first Sino-Iraqi trade and
payment agreement was signed on January 3, 1959. Under the terms of the agreement, China
would ship Iraq raw and industrial materials such as steel, aluminum, machines parts, electrical
materials, and industrial plant equipment, as well as textiles and luxury goods like dyestuffs,
paints, porcelain, silk, paper, and woolen. In exchange, Iraq exported hides and skins, cotton, oil
seeds, and tens of thousands of pounds of Zahdi dates. 42 By December of that year, eight Iraqi
delegations had visited China while three Chinese missions had journeyed to Iraq. 43
But 1959 also presented challenges to the Sino-Iraqi relationship that would
reverberate for another fifteen years. Although Beijing alleged that it “firmly supports every
nationalist movement,” 44 rebellions in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions of Iraq directly pitted
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China’s commitments to nationalism and communism in the Arab world against each other.
By February 1959, tensions came to a head between Qasim and his communist following on
one side, and Iraqis who supported Nasser and Arab nationalism on the other. The
nationalists sought Iraq’s incorporation into Nasser’s UAR and were led by Abd al-Wahab
al-Shawaf, the garrison commander of the northern city of Mosul. Aware of the looming
specter of insurrection, Qasim shrewdly provoked an outbreak of violence that he could use
to paint the nationalists as a dangerous threat. Qasim allowed the Iraqi communist Partisans
of Peace to hold a mass rally in Mosul, reinforced by the communist-led Popular Resistance
militia. When the Peace Partisans began scuffling with Nasser supporters and burned down a
pro-Nasser restaurant, Al-Shawaf responded by having his officers round up Peace Partisans
and ordering the head of the parading communists shot, thus beginning the Mosul Revolt
against Qasim’s government. 45
The short-lived revolt ended with al-Shawaf’s death. Chinese responses to the event
illustrate China’s understanding of its place in the world at the time. Where Beijing once had
commended revolutionary action in Iraq, it now rushed to praise Qasim for the suppression
of the Shawaf rebellion while eagerly denouncing Nasser’s alleged intervention and support
for al-Shawaf and the Arab nationalists. What’s more, Chinese leaders attempted to frame the
United States as somehow responsible for this mostly regional, if not domestic, squabble.
Although it is a matter of fact that the communist rally in Mosul was ordered by Qasim
himself, Beijing reported in the Peking Review that:
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that Iraq’s traitors started their armed
rebellion at Mosul just when the U.S. had signed bilateral military agreements with
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and the Iraqi people had held a mass rally at Mosul against
these agreements. 46
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While it is true that the U.S. expressed its support for the pro-Nasser nationalists, there is no
evidence to support China’s suggestion that the America-led forces of imperialism were the
direct catalysts of the Shawaf insurrection.
The fallout of the March Mosul Revolt and another communist-inspired riot in Kirkuk in
July did not bode well for Sino-Iraqi relations. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) had by this time
split into two factions: one pro-Soviet faction that supported internal and external government
policies; and one pro-China faction that, in an ironic twist of fate, was blamed for the communist
revolts in Mosul and Kirkuk. Although this claim was never substantiated, Qasim nonetheless
seized the opportunity to quash all communists and preclude their increasing influence in Iraq.
Accusing the communists of plotting to overthrow his regime, Qasim initiated a purging
campaign by banning the ICP, closing down its offices and dismissing its members from
government posts in the military and information and broadcasting departments. Qasim also
accused China of supplying arms to the Iraqi communists and banned Maoist literature. 47 Despite
these setbacks, China remained nominally supportive of Iraq and Qasim, if only because of his
commitment to anti-imperialism and the belief that China’s help was required to liberate the
region from the sinister influence of the West. 48 Thus, while China equivocated with respect to
its support for nationalism and communism in Iraq at this time, its resolve in combating
imperialism was unshakable.
Challenges to the Sino-Iraqi Relationship (1960-1975)
Compared to 1958-1960, the next fifteen years of the Sino-Iraqi relationship were
comparatively uneventful, encompassing some good moments but mostly trending downward.
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One explanation accounting for the cooling off of Sino-Iraqi relations during this period was
Iraq’s domestic turbulence. Iraq during the 1960s was beset by Ba’athist Party military coups in
1963 and 1968, as well as by insurrections by Kurdish ethnic nationalists in the north. Unsure of
Iraq’s future direction, China was reluctant to “take sides” in a rapidly changing political milieu.
Accordingly, Calabrese asserts that China’s lukewarm political ties to Iraq from 1960 to 1965
might have demonstrated an exercise in caution and restraint. 49 More importantly, however, this
lull in Sino-Iraqi activity reflected Iraq’s increasing preference for and reliance on the Soviet
Union, which was quickly becoming China’s chief rival for attention in the Middle East. China’s
burgeoning antagonism toward the Soviet Union during the 1960s generated a new regional
strategy: the support of revolutionary movements (particularly in Palestine and Oman), and more
relevant to this study, the attempt to combat the forms of control enumerated by Nan Han-chen
during his 1965 speech. China sought to roll back superpower monopolies over the resources and
oil industry, open up alternative markets for goods and services, and serve as substitute source of
economic aid. Consequently, the Beijing-Baghdad economic relationship forged bitterly ahead,
even in the face of an increasingly strained political relationship.
The Sino-Iraqi relationship during this period was delicate. In February 1960, the Chinese
government donated transportation and communications equipment to the Iraqi civil defense
department, including six ambulances, six Chinese-made fire trucks, two trucks, and twenty
radio sets. 50 Baghdad dismissed these gifts by publicly contrasting them with much more
generous American aid projects. 51 This political embarrassment notwithstanding, Beijing was
still eager to demonstrate its commercial support of the Middle Eastern country. In May 1960, a
trade and payments agreement was signed providing that China would supply Iraq with cotton
49
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cloths, silks, rolled steel, and machinery. In return China would import Iraqi dates, hides,
petroleum products, and notably, crude oil. 52
It was at about this time that oil assumed a role as a commodity of crucial political – but
not yet economic – consequence. That is to say, China’s oil imports during this time were
negligible: oil’s utility primarily derived from its role as yet another example of Western
imperialism. From 1961 to 1962, the Chinese government lent its full-throated support to the
Iraqi government’s efforts to wrest control of its oil exports from Western corporations. The
Chinese claimed that five U.S. oil companies controlled over 69% of the concessions areas in the
major Middle East oil-producing countries. Thus the struggle to recapture control over oil rights
was paramount to reclaiming national sovereignty. 53 When the Iraqi government promulgated a
law nationalizing the British, United States, and French capital-controlled Iraq Petroleum
Company, Beijing hailed these “just actions aimed at liquidating the vestiges of colonialism and
upholding national sovereignty.” 54
Political turbulence in 1963 and its consequent effects on the Iraqi Communist Party
added additional strain to the bilateral relationship. Ba’athists seized power in a military coup
and executed Qasim in February 1963. They condemned Qasim’s communist support despite the
uptick of persecution during the end of his regime and railed against the ICP’s use of terrorism
and violence to paralyze the state. 55 Ba’athist leaders then commenced persecution and
extirpation of Iraqi communists on a mass-scale, eliciting a toothless Chinese government outcry
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and demand that the suppression end. 56 The new Ba’athist regime was overthrown just nine
months later by Abd al-Salam Arif on November 18, 1963. In contrast to the Ba’athists, Arif was
more palatable to the Chinese leadership. A strong proponent of the non-alignment movement,
Arif maintained a neutral stance vis-à-vis both the superpowers. He found support from the CCP
for his policy of nationalizing key industrial and manufacturing enterprises and expanding
relations with other non-aligned countries. 57 The Chinese government seized this opportunity to
transform Iraq into a theater of Sino-Soviet rivalry, hoping to promote its relationship with the
nascent Arif regime and to foreclose the possibility of any additional Soviet influence in the
country. China denounced the pro-Soviet faction of the ICP as enemies of the Arif regime and
blamed their adherence to Khrushchev’s revisionist line as the catalyst for the deaths during the
Mosul and Kirkuk incidents in 1959. 58 In response, the Soviets charged that “the Chinese
representatives in Iraq wanted to take advantage of the fact that the Iraqi communist party had
become leaderless to create their own schismatic group there.” 59 China’s disenchantment with
the Qasim and Ba’athist regimes is evidence that the harsh treatment of Iraqi communists was a
bone of contention in Sino-Iraqi relations during the early 60s. But that was not China’s primary
concern. In fact, the CCP’s subordination of the communist question to the goodwill of SinoIraqi relations indicates that China had prioritized combating the Soviet Union above all else.
China’s actions suggest that it viewed the issue of communist persecution in the same way that it
viewed the significance of the question of oil in the 1960s.
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Sino-Iraqi relations deteriorated around the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when
China became convinced that it could no longer work with the Iraqi government. Abd al-Salam
Arif had died in 1966 and was replaced by his brother Abd al-Rahman Arif, who attempted to
strengthen ties with the West. In the eyes of the Chinese, the so-called Six Day War was
tantamount to an egregious display of American imperialism. It saw the Soviet attempt to make
peace in the UN as reflecting their collusion with the U.S. in a joint scheme to achieve
worldwide domination. In opposition to the United States and its backing of Israel, the Chinese
denounced Israel’s status as a “made up” state and reaffirmed their unconditional support for the
Arab world. After the fighting commenced on June 5, the Chinese government immediately
condemned the war as “another towering crime against the Arab people committed by U.S.
imperialism and its tool Israel as well as a grave provocation against the people of Asia, Africa,
and the rest of the world.” 60
But as fearful as the CCP was of American aggression, it was equally abhorrent of the
actions of its Kremlin rivals. Although the Soviets were committed to their Arab allies, they were
still loath to see unnecessary violence in the Gulf if it could be prevented. On May 27, the Soviet
prime minister indicated to the American president that if the United States intervened in an
Arab-Israeli war, so too would the Soviet Union; but if the United States stayed out of the war,
the Soviets would refrain as well. 61 As part of a Cultural Revolution-inspired revolutionary
foreign policy, Beijing had embraced a policy of supporting Arab allies and more forceful
resistance against the United States. Beijing was incensed by Moscow’s “two-faced behavior,”
particularly when the Soviet Union introduced Security Council draft resolutions from June 7 to
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June 9 calling for the belligerent nations to ceasefire. For Beijing, this was unimpeachable
evidence of the Soviet revisionist line, as the Soviets clearly disagreed with the Chinese that this
war and the state of Israel were mere vehicles of U.S. aggression. In short, the Chinese
leadership were convinced that:
Through its treachery and capitulation, the Soviet revisionist clique not only aims at
working in league with U.S. imperialism to put out the anti-U.S. conflagration in the
Arab lands, but also intends to strike a deal with Washington at the expense of the Arab
people—all in pursuit of the counter-revolutionary line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for
world domination. 62

In addition, the Chinese were upset that the war seemed to merely draw the Soviet Union
and Arab countries – including China’s formerly number one ally, Iraq – closer together. During
and in the aftermath of the Six Day War, the Soviets attempted to curry favor with Arab
countries by providing military support. Although Iraqi forces did not fight in the war, its troops
were stationed in Jordan and Syria on a long-term basis, and anti-Zionist sentiment propelled
Iraq’s increased arms purchases. 63 The first Soviet shipment to Iraq included ten MiG-21s and
two trainer planes; within ten days of the conflict, the Soviet Union had provided 325 fighter
planes, 300 tanks, and artillery and equipment to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. 64 Following the 1967
war, China became convinced that it would be problematic to work with the Iraqi government,
which to the CCP’s consternation had since grown even more dependent on the Soviet Union for
political and technical support. 65 And even though the 1967 war had provided Beijing with the
opportunity both to castigate the Soviet Union’s alleged betrayal of Arabs and warn of America’s
nefarious schemes, Beijing seemed to have the odds stacked against it. 66 China’s focus in the
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next few years would be on providing material, political, and technical support to other
revolutionary movements in the region. 67
During the 1970s, China saw the Soviet Union replacing the United States as the greatest
threat to regional and world stability. Realizing the danger that a Soviet-controlled Iraq could
pose to the region, China’s objective in Iraq from 1970-1975 was to prevent total Iraqi
dependence on the Soviet Union. Although their political relationship was worse than ever,
China began to welcome some of Iraq’s more radical foreign policy positions regarding the
Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq’s support of extreme Palestinian organizations. 68 More
importantly, Beijing sought to win Baghdad’s favor through enticing economic deals. In 1971,
China and Iraq signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. The agreement
called for Iraq to import sulfur while exporting chemical fertilizer to China; included also was a
provision that China would grant Iraq a $36 million interest-free loan, repayable over ten years,
with the start of repayment deferred until 1984. 69
China’s renewed approach, however, did little to turn Iraq against its Soviet partner, as a
fifteen-year Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty signed in April 1972 led once again to the cooling in
China’s relationship with Iraq. In sum, China’s relationship with Iraq in the period 1960-1975
was fraught with complications arising from a mixture of Iraqi domestic turbulence and Iraq’s
preference for relations with both superpowers rather than China. Clearly, China’s foreign policy

67

Chinese military and financial aid to national liberation struggles in the broader MENA region
included: $10 million in credits and small arms to the Algerian National Liberation Front in 1960; support
for Yemeni indigenous independence efforts against the British in 1967; financial, food, military, and
possibly personnel assistance to the Dhofar Liberation Front in Oman (later PFLOAG) in 1971; and such
extensive involvement in the Palestinian conflict that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat described China as
“the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and strengthening its perseverance.” See Harris, China
Considers the Middle East.
68
Bin Huwaidin, China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 140.
69
Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries,
(Munchen: K.G. Saur, 1989), 73.

From Beijing to Baghdad | 32

objectives here were hobbled by China’s limited material capabilities, and it was unable to
induce Iraq to share its ideological view of the world. That is not to say that this period had no
effect on the development of China’s regional policy. This was the era when Beijing began to see
that its definition of stability – that is, hedging against superpower influence – rested heavily on
economics, oil, and trade. Beijing would increasingly exploit those factors as policy tools.
Renewed Relationship (1975-1979)
In this last stage of the Cold War Period, China continued its policy of expanding
economic ties with Iraq for the purposes of improving the political atmosphere between the two
countries. The ultimate goal was still displacing the Soviet Union’s patronage. Two factors
accounted for the resurgence of Sino-Iraqi relations beginning in 1975: friction between the
Soviet Union and Iraq, and Iraq’s peace accord with Iran. Once again, these catalysts reflect the
complex web of international relations of the Cold War world, wherein exogenous circumstances
often affected China’s bilateral relationships in the region. During this time, Moscow was
attempting to isolate Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, who had steadily grown closer to the United States.
Iraq’s rapprochement with Egypt, in addition to its growing rivalry with the Ba’athist regime in
Syria, caused Moscow to temporarily limit arms deliveries to Baghdad. 70
China struck while the iron was hot, aiming to enhance Sino-Iraqi ties during a period of
strained Soviet-Iraqi relations. In July 1975, Iraq’s Vice-President Mohyiddin Marouf visited
Beijing. Deng Xiaoping graciously welcomed Vice-President Marouf and in a state banquet
speech, praised the Iraqi people’s persistence in combating imperialism and colonialism,
enjoined all Gulf countries to resolve their differences to prevent foreign intervention, and spoke
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of a new era in Sino-Iraqi friendship. 71 The visit marked a new stage in bilateral relations indeed.
The early 70s had already established a strong economic orientation for Sino-Iraqi cooperation.
This period continued the trend by deepening the relationship, particularly in the construction
and trade industries.
Starting in 1975, China negotiated and began working on large-scale construction
projects to enhance Sino-Iraqi comity. The largest of these was the construction of the 667-meter
Mosul Bridge I, which linked the Baghdad-Mosul highway to an international road connecting
Mosul to Turkey. In addition, the Chinese agreed to build a sports hall in Baghdad during 1976
as part of a new economic and technical agreement and completed a washing and spinning mill
in Kifri during July 1978. In August of that year, China also signed a protocol on the
construction of the Sherquat highway bridge on the Tigris in northern Iraq. 72 These projects were
the first steps in a long-term trend of offering Chinese expertise and labor on projects that would
benefit Iraq’s economy.
Bilateral trade also flourished. By 1975, trade relations had reached a new point, with
total volume of trade 8.5 times larger than that of 1973, and almost $60 million higher than that
of 1974. 73 In 1977, both countries signed a trade agreement, whereby Iraq would supply the PRC
with 100,000 tons of sulfur and chemical fertilizer. 74 China also purchased over 100,000 tons of
Iraqi dates, thereby becoming Iraq’s largest importer of the product. 75 The sheer volume of
China’s trade in dates suggests that the importation of this commodity went beyond mere
satisfaction of demand. It was at least partially a calculation on the part of the CCP to enhance
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bilateral relations by playing to strengths in the Iraqi agricultural market. It is important to note
that during this time, foreign imports were still meant to play an auxiliary, rather than primary,
role in China’s development. Thus, Sino-Iraqi economic cooperation reflected China’s foreign
policy goals rather than economic self-interest. 76
CONCLUSION
China’s preoccupation with the threat posed by superpowers was all-consuming during
the Cold War Period. Indeed, virtually all the CCP’s decisions regarding the Middle East can be
viewed through this lens. In sum, the employment of economics as a tool for political and
strategic goals is what delineates the Cold War Period from the next two eras of Chinese foreign
policy. Also worth noting is that despite China’s often-vocal support for or opposition to
developments in the Gulf, China’s capabilities were still limited during the Cold War Period.
China possessed neither the political or economic wherewithal to effect much real change in the
region. The prioritization of economic interests began during the Transition Period that roughly
coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978. Gradually, the PRC would begin to exert
influence concomitant with its own growing power and wealth over the next decade.
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III. THE TRANSITION PERIOD (1980-1988)
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
The Transition Period marked not only China’s growing influence in the Gulf region, but
a fundamental recalculation of its interests and how to secure them. On the one hand, China
could not totally discard its fear of the Soviet Union and superpower hegemony. But on the
other, this concern was overshadowed by the unprecedented volume of trade, labor and
contracting deals, and most importantly, arms sales that Beijing was conducting with Middle
East states. Although Beijing continued to publicly assert its opposition to superpower influence
and contended that any disruption to regional peace would open the door to superpower
intervention, Beijing’s actions spoke louder than its words. The case of the Iran-Iraq War will
show that by the mid-80s China had more or less abandoned the balance-of-power logic it
employed against the superpowers during the Cold War Period. Instead it prioritized the benefits
of trade and commercial relations with both Iraq and Iran. Essentially, Chinese Gulf policy
during the 1980s saw a transition from economic tools as a lubricant for political relationships to
economics becoming a major consideration in its own right. In foreign as in domestic policy,
China’s definition of “stability” during the 1980s experienced profound transition.
Two main factors account for this evolution over the decade: the perception that the
Soviet Union was weakening and the China’s increasing preoccupation with domestic economic
modernization. 77 The protracted war in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 is often referred to as “the
Soviet Union’s Vietnam.” The war mired the Soviet Union in a messy decade-long conflict and
in the process sapped the USSR of resources and morale. The Soviet Union’s repeated military
77
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setbacks against the mujahedeen, its high casualty count, its loss of valuable military equipment,
and generally disintegrating control over the Afghan political regime caused China to label
Afghanistan, with quite a bit of tongue-in-cheek, the “quagmire that consumes human and
material resources.” 78 The United States’ similar experience in Vietnam convinced the Chinese
leadership that neither superpower posed the same level of threat to international security or
Chinese interests as they did in the preceding era. In addition, Chinese analysts believed that a
rise in multipolarity, advances in military technology, and a strategic balance between the
superpowers made the prospect of global war less likely. Although the potential threat of
superpower hegemonism still existed, China had shed its obsession with the military security
concerns of a hedging strategy and was moving the world towards a “new international economic
order.” 79
Deng Xiaoping’s administration shifted the PRC’s focus toward an agenda of
pragmatism and an emphasis on material incentives with the ultimate goal of modernizing China.
Beginning in 1978, China pursued a policy of enlivening the domestic economy and opening up
to the outside. Economic modernization was designed to raise China’s standard of living, reverse
the damage of the Cultural Revolution, and equip China for an enhanced position on the global
stage. Not surprisingly, the combination of these factors – the perceived decline of the Soviet
Union and China’s focus on economic modernization – prompted a new approach to global
politics.
The enunciation of China’s “Independent Foreign Policy” in 1982 sought to strengthen
China’s unity with the Third World and to progressively improve relations with both the Soviet
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Union and the United States. The CCP’s new attitude toward both countries was neatly captured
by Premier Zhao Ziyang’s statement to the National People’s Congress:
We take a principled stand in handling our relations with the United States and the
Soviet Union. We will not refrain from improving relations with them because we
opposed their hegemonism, nor will we give up our anti-hegemonist stand
because we want to improve relations with them, nor will we try to improve our
relations with one of them at the expense of the other. 80

Central to this new foreign policy was a renewed emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence outlined at Bandung in 1955. The Five Principles’ focus on sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence meshed well with Beijing’s newfound
attitude of neutrality on the global stage. In favoring neither superpower, the Chinese hoped to
produce the peaceful international environment needed for trade relations that would in turn
generate domestic modernization and growth. 81 But it is crucial to understand that China was not
interested in peace as a general matter; after all, China actually benefited from the war between
Iraq and Iran. Rather, the “world peace” that China sought was couched specifically in terms of
the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the United States. It simply meant both superpowers’
relative non-interference with Chinese conduct in the Gulf.
Despite Beijing’s renewed commitment to the health of its bilateral relationships with the
U.S. and USSR, it was careful to reserve the right to oppose hegemonism if necessity forced its
hand. Indeed, speeches by Chinese leadership on the Independent Foreign Policy always paid lip
service to this perennial objective. In April of 1982, Zhao Ziyang summarized China’s foreign
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policy goals in the same breath as “opposing hegemonism and maintaining world peace.” 82
Foreign Minister Huang Hua’s October address to the UN General Assembly stressed China’s
willingness to “unite with countries of the Third World and join hands with all other countries
and forces working for peace to combat hegemonism and maintain world peace.” 83 But the
parameters of what constituted hegemony and how China would respond to it experienced a
subtle shift. During the 1960s and 70s, the expansion of either superpower’s political and
economic ties with Middle East states was ipso facto “hegemony.” Now, however, China’s
emphasis on economic growth meant that the CCP was practically willing to turn a blind eye to
the actions of the Soviets and the Americans – so long as neither jeopardized China’s
modernization efforts. Thus, China’s objection to superpower hegemony during the Transition
Period was mostly a rhetorical tool.
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988)
Background
To the West, the Iran-Iraq War remains the oft-forgotten Gulf War. The conflict failed to
draw much attention from Western powers until 1987, when fighting threatened to cut off the
flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz. Only then did the international community take
serious steps in the United Nations to end the conflict. But for China, the Iran-Iraq War was a
critical juncture in the development of its Gulf policy. Although China publicly expressed its
fears that the war might permit the resurgence of superpower interference in the Gulf, it in fact
profited from the internecine conflict.
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The Iran-Iraq War commenced on September 22, 1980 when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi
forces invaded Iran in an attempt to seize the Khuzestan Province. Iran under the rule of
Ayatollah Khomeini had made it a priority to export its revolutionary Shia ideology abroad.
Khomeini singled out Iraq in particular as a target, as he believed he could appeal to Iraq’s
oppressed Shia majority to overthrow Saddam’s Sunni regime. 84 The new Iranian regime no
longer felt bound by the 1975 Algiers Accord 85, and openly called on Iraq’s Shia citizens to
launch a jihad against Saddam’s regime. Saddam took this threat seriously, sensitive as he was to
the longstanding unrest amongst Iraq’s Shia population. Additionally, the Khuzestan Province
appealed to Saddam for multiple reasons. First, the region was a lucrative source of oilfields.
Second, nationalism came into play, as the area contained a sizable population of Arab
inhabitants. Third, Khuzestan seemed easy to capture, given its position on the Iraqi side of the
Zagros Mountains. Saddam believed that in seizing the province, he would spark a new
revolution in Iran that would empower a new regime friendlier to Iraq’s interests. In this way,
Saddam would be able to seize Iran’s oil and eliminate an existential threat in one blow. 86 The
campaign did not go as planned and both countries remained mired in a war of attrition for close
to a decade.
The war presented the CCP with a dilemma since both nations were considered friendly
to China. Public statements on the war issued from Beijing, however, were somewhat
misleading, as they suggested a tone of concern that obscured Beijing’s true intentions.
Throughout the war, China maintained three official objectives as enumerated by Zhao Ziyang
the day after the outbreak of fighting: 1) the conflict would be resolved peacefully through
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negotiations; 2) the conflict would remain free of superpower intervention; and 3) the situation
would not deteriorate. Zhao hoped that these objectives would not only serve the interests of the
people of Iran and Iraq, but that they would be “conducive to peace and stability in the Gulf
area.” 87 But in practice, China seemed little concerned with any of these objectives. Despite
being the only country on the UN Security Council enjoying warm relations with both Iraq and
Iran, China was not invested in negotiating for peace. Beijing sponsored no initiatives to resolve
the war; nor did it seek leadership in multilateral organizations with influence in the Gulf such as
the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77. 88 Still, over the course of 1980, Beijing
reiterated its firm commitment to the three enumerated principles. During a visit to Yemen, VicePremier Ji Pengfei delivered a press statement reaffirming that “China maintains friendly
relations with both Iraq and Iran. We sincerely hope that the armed conflicts will be settled
through peaceful consultations. Superpower attempts to meddle and interfere should be guarded
against.” 89 Still, Beijing’s ostensible fear of the escalating war should be taken with a grain of
salt. In fact, it is the case that China’s interests were extremely well served by and during the
Iran-Iraq War.
Given China’s all-consuming focus on economic modernization, one might at first be
inclined to assume that the instability attending regional warfare would harm China’s bilateral
economic relationship with Iraq. This was patently not the case. Throughout the war, China
greatly expanded the labor and contracting industries it had built in Iraq during the late 70s. By
1987, just one year before the war’s conclusion, Iraq had become China’s number one market for
labor export, valued at $657.67 million. Iraq had also become Beijing’s number one market for
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contracted projects and was valued at $670.04 million.90 From 1979 to 1986, close to 20,000
Chinese laborers were assigned to 143 projects in Iraq. 91 Although China’s construction projects
during the late 70s were limited to the provision of cheap and efficient labor, after 1981, the size
and volume of China’s construction projects swelled prodigiously. For example, in addition to
constructing electric power plants, docks, petroleum refineries, and large residential projects, the
PRC Construction Corporation completed the Kifil Shinafiya irrigation project in 1987 – then
China’s largest irrigation project in the Gulf – alone valued at an unprecedented $174 million. 92
Altogether, China garnered $1.328 billion purely from its labor and contracting deals in Iraq
during the 1980s. 93 In addition, China and Iraq continued to sign deals on trade and joint
economic and technical cooperation. These included a 1980 agreement for China’s importation
of Iraqi nitrogenous fertilizers worth $46 million, and an agreement in 1985 providing for
Chinese importation of Iraqi phosphate, sulfur, and palm dates and Iraqi importation of Chinese
textiles, industrial, metal, and mineral products. 94 Clearly, China profited greatly during the
entire eight years that Iraq was at war, despite the CCP’s steadfast insistence that economic
modernization might be imperiled by war in the Gulf. It would appear that despite its public
protestations, China’s economic modernization was in fact materially unaffected, if not abetted,
during the war. Although Chinese construction and labor projects flourished during this time, the
revenue gained from these conventional forms of commerce paled in comparison to the sum
China earned through arms deals with Iran and Iraq during the period.
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Motivations and Origin of the Arms Trade
At the Plenary Meeting of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly in September
1980, Huang Hua announced China’s deep concern over the recent military conflict and its hope
that “the two parties will cease hostilities speedily and settle their disputes through peaceful
negotiations so as not to be exploited by those harbouring ulterior motives.” 95 Huang’s warning
against exploitation refers implicitly to the world superpowers, which might have seized this
opportunity to intervene militarily under the pretense of restoring order. Still, it is difficult to
parse through the dense web of possible Chinese motives during this time: was China really
fearful of further superpower encroachment into the Gulf, or was the CCP’s insistence on
nonintervention mere kabuki obscuring China’s more important economic interests? After all,
despite its objections to the war, China became a top arms dealer to both belligerents throughout
the 80s. During the Cold War Period, China distributed weapons and military technology free of
charge to revolutionary movements in the Gulf; but during the Transition Period, China gladly
sold arms to those willing to pay. Most China analysts agree that both strategic and economic
motivations factored into China’s decision to commence arms sales to the Gulf during the 80s.
The question, then, is whether the CCP assigned equal weight to both concerns, or whether it
valued one over the other. Two main theories explain China’s actions during this period.
Strategic Explanation
Ample evidence suggests that China’s arms sales in the Middle East may have begun as a
means to combat Soviet influence in the region. Although it is true that China was reassured by
the outcome of the Soviet war in Afghanistan because it distracted the Soviet Union and sapped
its resources, this was only evident in the latter half of the decade. When Soviet boots first
stepped into Afghanistan, the Chinese reacted with indignation and alarm, roundly criticizing the
95

“Comments on Iraq-Iran Conflict,” Xinhua, September 24, 1980, Trans. FBIS, FBIS-CHI-80-188.

Lee |

43

invasion as hegemonistic, a gross interference in regional affairs, and a wanton violation of
international norms. 96 The invasion sparked a new sense of urgency for containing Soviet
influence. In response to this perceived threat, the PRC attempted to engage more closely with
Middle Eastern regimes. 97
Diplomatically, it normalized relations with all major regional governments with the
exception of Saudi Arabia and Israel. China buttressed these diplomatic overtures by
strengthening military ties. Just as China sought to present itself as an alternative market to the
United States for goods and services during the Cold War Period, it returned to this reasoning by
presenting itself as an alternative market for Soviet weapons. PRC-manufactured arms for export
were practically clones of Soviet-designed weaponry – they were often just like Soviet
technology, operated similarly, and frequently even contained interchangeable parts. 98 The
production of these weapons and weapons parts made China an easy alternative for former
Soviet clients. On the whole, however, this argument is less compelling, as China’s conduct
indicates that it was less worried by the prospect of a resurgent Soviet Union and more
concerned with general economic growth. The strategic explanation might account for China’s
actions during the early part of the Iran-Iraq War; but by 1984, this rationale was subsumed by
the more important goal of earning revenue.
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Economic Explanation
First and foremost, China’s overriding motivation during the Iran-Iraq war was breaking
into the global arms bazaar and selling weapons. 99 With the outbreak of the war, China had
found two willing customers. If its arms sales to both sides prolonged the length of the conflict,
China had essentially acquired a ready-made market that would boost the PRC’s economic
prosperity. The PRC was particularly well positioned to take advantage of Iraq and Iran’s needs,
as Western weapons were too expensive and often accompanied by political conditions and
unwelcome moralizing. Both clients were well served by China’s specialty: large quantities of
inexpensive basic ammunitions. 100
Another perspective on the increased arms sales emphasizes China’s financial goals and
burdens at the time. Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations” campaign catalyzed China’s arms
trade with Iraq and Iran. Enunciated at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in
December 1978, Deng’s Four Modernizations were intended to make China a great economic
power by the middle of the 21st century. 101 Of the four, Deng’s Third Modernization focused
specifically on national security and the People’s Liberation Army. Given the downgraded threat
posed by the United States and Soviet Union, Deng placed defense modernization low on the list
of priorities, such that the portion of Chinese gross national income devoted to defense was
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scheduled to fall from 17.5% to 7.4% by 1989. 102 These radical reductions to the power, size,
responsibility, and funding of the defense industry threatened to make the PLA a financial
liability. In order to remain economically viable, the defense establishment, which included the
PLA and military production factories, needed to commercialize their products and find a way to
earn revenue. 103 Enterprises primarily devoted to the production of weapons and items of defense
saw two ways to raise funds: converting excess capacity to the production of civilian goods, and
selling to the international market whatever defense items were in excess of the quota provided
to the PLA. 104 Any revenue gained was shared between the central government and the parent
production ministry of the factory for housing, worker benefits, salary increases, capital
investment, and research and development. 105
The independent prerogatives of the PLA in this effort should not be discounted: given its
reduced priority under the Deng administration, the PLA’s leadership had deep reservations
about its role in China’s new society. The additional revenue it earned from arms sales promised
both a substantially larger degree of autonomy as well as validation of its achievements. 106
Although such arms sales were initially rooted in exigency, PLA leaders soon realized that the
trade was a profitable way to further military modernization. Greater overall revenue and lower
per-unit costs could be realized if arms factories produced new weapons for export in addition to
merely selling excess products. Support for these efforts might also have reflected the fact that
the Ministry of Finance received part of the funds (which were added to the nation’s hard-
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currency reserves), and some key individuals earned what were basically sales commissions on
their deals. 107
Arms Sales to Iraq and Iran
Overview: China and Arms Sales to the Third World
From 1950-1980, the United States and Soviet Union dominated the arms market in the
Middle East. From 1976-1980, just before Chinese arms transfers commenced, the entire value
of arms transfers to the Middle East reached $38.6 billion, or 35% of the world’s total. Of these
arms transfers, the United States and its allies alone constituted $22.7 billion, or almost 60% of
total transfer agreements to the Middle East. 108 The Soviet Union comprised most of the rest,
leaving the Chinese share too negligible for mention or even measurement. But by the end of the
decade, China ranked fifth in the world in the value of arms transfer agreements to the Third
World (Fig. 1), and fourth in actual arms transfer deliveries to the Third World (Fig. 2). 109, 110
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Fig. 1 – Arms Transfer Agreements with the Third World, 1981-1988
Leading Suppliers Compared (in millions of 1990 US dollars)

Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major
Supplier, 1976-1983," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984).

Fig. 2 – Arms Transfer Deliveries with the Third World, 1981-1988
Leading Suppliers Compared (in millions of 1990 US dollars)

Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major
Supplier, 1976-1983," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984).

During the early Cold War Period, most of China’s support for Third World regimes was
rhetorical in nature. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution’s Revolutionary Foreign
Policy, the military and economic assistance the PRC rendered was paltry in comparison to what
China could offer by the 1980s through its arms deals. Even so, looking at the sheer volume of
the arms transfer market that China commanded in comparison to the Soviet Union might lead
one to believe that the PRC’s influence was negligible – after all, the Soviet Union delivered
more than ten times the amount of weapons to the Third World from 1981-1988.
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Given China’s still-weak economic foundation, it could not hope to surpass the Soviet
Union in sheer volume of arms transfers. But the Iran-Iraq War did help China to make
appreciable headway in closing this gap through trade with Iraq and Iran, which comprised
61.3% of all China’s arms transfer agreements with the Third World from 1981-1988. 111 Both
belligerents were in desperate need of arms suppliers and willing to patronize major suppliers
like the Soviet Union and minor ones like the PRC. China saw this as a golden opportunity to
increase its political and economic relevance. Arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War made up over
one-fifth of all arms transfer agreements by suppliers to the Third World during 1981-1988. 112
China’s arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War increased its regional role relative to the Soviet
Union. From 1981-1988, the PRC’s share of the value of all arms transfer agreements with Iran
and Iraq collectively was 15%. The Soviet Union’s share of arms transfer agreements was 32%,
slightly over twice as much. 113 This is further corroborated by the data concerning China’s arms
transfer deliveries to Iraq and Iran. Combined, China’s share of all arms deliveries to Iraq and
Iran was just under half of what the Soviet Union delivered to Iraq (see Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3 – Value of Arms Deliveries to Iran and Iraq, 1981-1988

Source: Rachel Schmidt, “Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990,” RAND (1991).

These comparisons with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, it is important to question to
what degree China’s motivations here were rooted in strategic rather than economic
considerations. It is tempting to interpret this apparent arms race with the Soviet Union in the
Middle East as a sublimated form of competition. However, it is more likely the case that these
sales demonstrated China’s attempts to seize a spot in the global arms bazaar that had been
vacated or neglected by the Soviets.
Tilting Toward Iraq (1980-1983)
During the early part of the Iran-Iraq War, China provided more military support to Iraq
than it did to Iran. This “tilt,” as it were, was not undertaken out of a conscious preference for the
regime of Saddam Hussein. Instead, it was a natural result of the opportunities presented to the
Chinese. From the end of the 1967 Six Day War until 1978, virtual all of Iraq’s armament was
procured from the Soviet Union. Owing to an increasingly strained relationship with the Soviets
during the mid-1970s, Iraq sought to diversify the countries from which it bought its weapons in
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the hope that this would reduce the amount of leverage that any one country could exert over its
internal policies. In addition, like the Chinese, the Iraqis reacted very strongly to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although Saddam’s regime had been the happy recipient of
Soviet aid for many years, physical incursion by Soviet troops into the Gulf worried Saddam,
who feared this invasion might set a further precedent permitting additional invasions into his or
other nations. Soviet-Iraqi relations collapsed shortly thereafter: in January 1980, Iraq voted in
favor of a UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion and demanding an immediate removal
of Soviet forces. 114 In response, the Soviet Union embargoed any arms transfers to Iraq
beginning in 1980 until 1982. Since Baghdad was in need of a new supplier to upkeep its costly
war with Iran, it turned to Beijing for assistance.
Chinese leaders initially denied having sold munitions directly to either Iran or Iraq.
Strictly speaking, this was true. When the Iran-Iraq War first broke out, Chinese leaders called
for a peaceful end to the fighting, restraint by both sides, and non-involvement by outside
powers. In keeping with the moral high ground they had claimed (and to avoid angering other
Arab governments hostile to Iran), top CCP officials decided that Chinese entities should not sell
munitions directly to either country. 115 Instead, China sold weapons through several intermediary
countries. Jordan served as the major hub for arms transfers to Iraq. Unclassified International
Monetary Fund (IMF) trade statistics on Chinese exports, for example, reveal that although
China exported next to nothing to Jordan in 1981, the value of exports to Jordan soared to $1.32
billion in 1982, $1.53 billion in 1983, and $1.26 billion in 1984. Similarly, Syria and North
Korea were the major intermediaries for Chinese munitions sales to Iran. 116 In this way, the
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Chinese government could easily deny contradicting its own edict about neutrality toward both
parties. Throughout the war, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian continued to deny as “groundless”
U.S. allegations that China was selling arms to both Iraq and Iran. 117 The government also
denied knowledge of the accidental transfers of weapons to the belligerent countries. When
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Ma Yuzhen was pressed on the transfer of
weapons to Iran and Iraq, he replied: “the international arms market is very complicated.
Therefore, we have no way of finding out how other countries procure their weapons from this
market.” 118
According to the U.S. government, in total China signed arms agreements with Iraq
worth approximately $3.6 billion during the period 1980-1983. 119 Given the covert nature of
these dealings, it is only possible to surmise the total volume of arms transfers; however, the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Chinese sales to Iraq
during this period included approximately 2500 tanks, 130 fighter aircraft, 650 armored
personnel carriers, and 100 towed multiple rocket launchers. Many of these shipments were
delivered through Egypt or Jordan, or otherwise assembled and produced in Iraq itself (see
Appendix 2). 120
Uptick in Sales to Iran (1984-1987)
Although China’s arms agreements with Iran totaled only $505 million from 1980-1983,
from 1984 until the end of the war, China’s arms agreements with Iran totaled $2.5 billion. 121
Concurrently, the latter half of the war saw a relative decline in the volume of arms transfers
from China to Iraq. It is unclear what exactly accounted for this pivot toward Iran in China’s
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arms sales. One possible theory is that China was responding to a shift in Moscow’s policies
toward Iran and Iraq. Moscow intended to forge closer relations with Teheran during the early
part of the war; it is reasonable to think that this was one impetus for Moscow’s severing of
relations with Baghdad in 1980. But after attempts at improving the Soviet-Iranian relationship
proved fruitless, Moscow resumed its arms sales to Baghdad and ended sales to Iran. 122 China
may have seized this opportunity to shore up relations with the new Iranian regime, especially to
compensate for its close relations with the Shah up until 1979. In any case, anti-Soviet hedging
considerations probably played no more than a marginal role in this shift toward Iran; instead, it
was motivated by a glaring vacancy in the Iranian arms market. This economic explanation is
lent credence by the Reagan administration’s Operation Staunch, the 1983 arms embargo against
the Islamic Republic by the United States and its allies as part of the West’s “tilt toward Iraq.”
Now that Iran was no longer able to obtain weapons from the United States or its allies, China
filled a much-needed void.
In April 1983, a high-level Iranian delegation allegedly made a secret visit to Beijing,
where they purportedly conducted a $1.3 billion arms transfer deal with the Chinese; North
Korea served as the intermediary. 123 Two additional agreements were signed in 1985. The first
was worth $1 billion was signed in Tehran by Zhang Jingfu and Iranian chief of staff Ismail
Suhrabi. It stipulated that China would deliver an arsenal of Chinese-made Soviet clones,
including aircraft, tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles to Iran in
exchange for payment in hard currency and oil shipments over a period of two years. 124 The
second deal was signed in June 1985 and reportedly worth $1.16 billion, with a Hong Kong122
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based firm headed by a British national serving as an intermediary for the sale. Another arms
sales contract reportedly worth $3.1 billion was concluded in 1986. Significantly, this deal
provided Iran with HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles that allowed it to strike effectively at
oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s possession of these Chinese-made missiles ultimately
brought America into the fray, as will be explained below. The last known agreement was
concluded in 1987 and included Chinese construction of several factories to produce rockets,
artillery, helicopters, and ammunition. In short, arms sales constituted the most important
element of the Sino-Iranian partnership during the 1980s and went a long way toward the
normalization of relations following the 1979 Iranian revolution. 125
From 1981-1988 China conducted approximately $3.9 billion in arms transfer agreements
with Iran, and $5.52 billion with Iraq. 126 With respect to both countries, China made significant
headway in establishing itself as a politically and economically relevant partner during the
1980s. Although China still lagged far behind the Soviet Union and other countries in the total
share of arms agreements with Iraq, it still commanded 12% of arms agreements by 1988 (Fig.
4). This is impressive, given that Iraq was one of the Soviet Union’s largest client states, and
given that the PRC conducted little to no arms deals with Iraq before the 1980s. China’s arms
trade strategy was particularly effective in Iran, where it took advantage of Moscow’s stale
relations with Tehran to own 23% of the value of arms agreements during the decade (Fig. 4),
becoming Iran’s dominant supplier of weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. 127
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Fig. 4 – Share of Arms Transfer Agreements, 1981-1988

Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major
Supplier, 1976-1983" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984).

Analysis: United States Involvement and Conclusion of War (1987-1988)
Although Beijing conducted these arms deals with relative impunity during the first six
years of the conflict, the last two years saw Beijing’s heightened concern as the threat of US and
Soviet involvement increased. Initially, Washington’s general antipathy toward both countries
ensured that it did nothing to stand in the way of the fighting. Washington observed with barelyconcealed glee as both states checked each other, producing a sort of fragile balance of power in
the Gulf. And while war between the two Gulf countries in and of itself did not really concern
Washington, the war’s potential to negatively impact the free flow of oil did.
By 1987, the United States possessed fairly conclusive proof that the Chinese had been
supplying Iran and Iraq with weapons despite their claims to the contrary. In the eyes of the
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West, the PRC’s sale of HY-2 Silkworm cruise missiles to Iran represented an enormous threat to
stability in the Gulf. The Silkworm missiles’ 60-mile range now meant that Iran had the
capability to target oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, a 34-mile long passage through which
much of Gulf oil passes en route to other countries. Any threat to the free flow of oil from the
Gulf would have had disastrous consequences on the global economy. 128 United States officials
and media outlets excoriated the Chinese government for ratcheting up tensions and possibly
jeopardizing international oil security, but the Chinese response equivocated between outright
denial and reluctant admission that sales had occurred through third parties. In mid-1987, the
Chinese informed the U.N. Security Council that it was finally ready to support a U.S.-backed
resolution calling for immediate ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. Nevertheless, U.S. fears about
the danger posed by the Silkworms were confirmed in October 1987, when Iranian-launched
Silkworms struck American-flagged tankers in the Gulf. In late October, the United States
announced that it had frozen any further sales of technology to the PRC. The ban was lifted
shortly thereafter when Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian pledged that the Chinese would no longer
provide Iran with additional Silkworms. 129
China’s conduct during the last two years of the war reveals something important about
its calculation of regional interests. Although China’s primary goal during the war was selling
arms to spur its own economic growth, its position as a relatively weak power meant that it
ultimately had to yield to the prerogatives of the United States. When the U.S. perceived China’s
Silkworm sales as a threat to its own oil interests, it publicly censured Chinese actions. China
responded with good faith efforts to forestall additional fighting by signing onto multilateral
ceasefire resolutions at the U.N. And when America threatened to cut off economic assistance,
128
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China promptly agreed to cease selling the missiles. Although China became more economically
independent as it continued along the path of modernization, this trend of balancing its economic
interests against a broader interest of appeasing the United States and international community
would come to define its conduct in the Post-Cold War Period (1990-2003).
CONCLUSION
In sum, Chinese foreign policy toward the Middle East during the Iran-Iraq War yielded
many benefits for China. First, the Chinese earned billions in hard currency through arms deals
that were used to fuel continued economic growth. Second, its military support for both regimes
– even if China was playing both ends against the middle – fostered goodwill with both
governments. Third, the war offered a valuable opportunity to test Chinese military technology
under real battlefield conditions. 130 Coming off the heels of a dismal performance in Vietnam,
China was able to analyze the performance of its weapons in direct contrast to U.S.-made Iranian
weapons, and Iraq’s Soviet-made weapons. 131 Fourth, the war went a long way toward
augmenting China’s prestige and relevance to Middle Eastern regimes.
More generally, the Transition Period was a formative juncture for determining the future
of China’s Middle East policy. Although the Independent Foreign Policy adopted by Beijing at
the beginning of the decade laid out a theoretical framework for Chinese bilateral relations
during the Transition Period, in reality, the PRC’s economic and bilateral relationships
progressed in fits and starts as the CCP struggled to crystallize China’s true interests. Initially, it
appeared unlikely that China would compromise its Cold War definition of stability – preventing
the further encroachment of superpower influence in the Gulf – by prolonging a war that
130

For a detailed study of the military warfare techniques China learned from the Iran-Iraq War and the
two American wars in Iraq, see Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, "Chinese Lessons
from Other Peoples' Wars,"Strategic Studies Institute (2011).
131
Shichor, “Decisionmaking in Triplicate,” 198.

Lee |

57

weakened the region as a whole. By the mid-80s, however, Beijing had all but abandoned this
hedging strategy in favor of economic growth. Thus, the Transition Period marked a shift in
China’s understanding of stability away from the Cold War preoccupation with hedging against
the superpowers and toward securing the regional conditions necessary for domestic
modernization. The Iran-Iraq War served as a vehicle for that change. At best, then, China’s
Middle East policy during the 80s, and certainly its policies toward Iraq and Iran, can be
described as experimental. 132
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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1989-PRESENT)
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
China’s Middle East foreign policy in the Post-Cold War Period first and foremost
reflected an intensification of China’s drive for economic modernization. I refer to this era as the
Post-Cold War Period not because Chinese Gulf policy somehow shifted in direct response to the
fall of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, by the end of the Transition Period the PRC’s fears
about the threat posed by either superpower ceased to really be a relevant consideration at all.
Instead, China’s new foreign policy during this era arose out of a set of circumstances unique to
the Post-Cold War era: the United States’ role as the sole superpower, the increased salience of
the United Nations, and China’s hunger for oil to feed its economic modernization policies. This
period is also defined by China’s need to balance its economic interests against its interest in
cooperating with the United States and the international community. This equilibrium is the
“stability” that China has sought after the events of Tiananmen in 1989. The following case
studies of the two Iraq Wars illustrate how political circumstances molded Chinese Middle East
policy from 1989-2003.
The Impact of Tiananmen: Western and the Middle Eastern Responses Compared
On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government brutally shut down a mostly student-led protest
in Tiananmen Square. The massive crackdown left somewhere from 900 to 3,000 people dead
and seriously tarnished the CCP’s international reputation.” 133 In response, many Western
countries, with the United States in the lead, immediately sought to punish the regime by
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imposing severe economic and trade sanctions, embargoing the transfer of arms and military
technology, and suspending important economic transactions such as loans, and private and
governmental investments. Diplomatic relations between the PRC and many Western
governments were also placed on hold. 134 Having quickly forfeited much of the goodwill it had
built since the beginning of its opening to the outside world after Mao’s death, the PRC found
itself dangerously isolated, perhaps more so than at any point in the post-Mao era. Thus, during
the first years of the Post-Cold War Period, China’s main foreign policy concern was extricating
itself from the public relations morass it had created for itself. Its conduct during the First Iraq
War, discussed below, should be viewed through the lens of China’s attempts to undo the
setbacks in economic and diplomatic relations following Tiananmen. 135
But first, it should be stressed that this approach only applied to China’s relations with
the West. After Tiananmen, Chinese-Middle East relations actually improved. Whereas Western
countries responded to the incident with scorching indictments of the Chinese government,
conservative Gulf regimes expressed understanding, even insisting that Western governments
had no right to interfere with China’s internal affairs. This difference in opinion can be explained
in a couple ways. First, while the West’s hostility was rooted in the abuse of human rights, the
authoritarian regimes of Gulf countries have historically placed less emphasis on these values.
Second, Middle Eastern governments appreciated China’s unwavering support – or at least,
consistent neutrality on regional issues – in contrast to their perennially rocky relations with the
West. 136 This sentiment was echoed by the CCP. Conservative Chinese leaders saw the West’s
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suddenly volatile criticisms of the Chinese government to be indicative of the West’s caprice and
untrustworthiness.
The fallout of Tiananmen provided incentives for a reaffirmation of China’s relationship
with the Middle East. Not only did the Middle East serve as a bedrock of support, but it was also
home to some of China’s crucial interests. The Middle East was one of the largest markets for
Chinese goods and labor services, arms, and boasted the largest supply of known oil reserves in
the world (Iraq containing the second largest supplies in the region as a whole). Although China
had hitherto prided itself on energy self-sufficiency, its meteoric economic development under
Deng Xiaoping ensured that this could only be sustained for so long. Old habits die hard as well:
China’s historical alignment with the Third World against the West probably contributed much
to the CCP’s attempt to consolidate relations with Middle Eastern countries. That is not to say
that the PRC preferred the support of Middle Eastern regimes to that of the West; merely that, as
the proverbial beggar, China could not afford to be choosy.
To ensure that its bilateral relations with Gulf regimes would continue to flourish, the
CCP launched a public relations counteroffensive. The Chinese government immediately
dispatched emissaries, including Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, NPC vice-chairman Wan Li, and
even President Yang Shangkun, to meet with Middle Eastern leaders and stress China’s intention
to remain an important economic partner in the region. 137 Given the diplomatic bombshell of
Tiananmen, China did all it could to revive its reputation abroad. The diplomatic overtures made
toward the Middle East express the economic importance and special cultural affinity the CCP
ascribed to Gulf countries and explain, in part, China’s hesitance to support intervention during
the First Iraq War.
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THE FIRST IRAQ WAR (1990-1991)
Background: A Win-Win Opportunity
The First Iraq War was a win-win situation for China: its participation in multilateral
discussions furnished the opportunity for China to position itself as a key player in the
international community, while simultaneously establishing China’s sympathy for vulnerable
Gulf monarchies. In other words, China was able to shore up its relations with the United States
and international community, while leaving its relations in the Middle East relatively unaffected
(except with respect to Iraq).
When Saddam Hussein’s military invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the international
outrage was palpable. Still reeling from the crushing debt of financing the Iran-Iraq War,
Saddam’s regime turned a covetous eye toward Kuwait. Not only did the small nation possess a
lucrative oil trade of its own, but it was indirectly inflicting economic damage upon its larger
neighbor. Kuwait refused to forgive Iraq’s debt from the war, and its overproduction of oil
flooded the market and depressed Iraq’s own petroleum revenues. Once again, Saddam also
relied on the reasoning that Kuwait comprised an historical part of the Iraqi homeland, styling
the invasion a “revolution in Kuwait.” Beijing joined the rest of the world in expressing its deep
concern, and as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War, made “appeals for an immediate end to military
action and for the settlement of the dispute through peaceful negotiations.” 138 But unlike the case
of China’s stance during the Iran-Iraq War, there was little to suggest duplicitous motives. Given
the outrage over China’s actions following Tiananmen, Beijing was at pains to stress its
eagerness to comply with international norms, and the international community’s absolute
rejection of Saddam’s actions ensured that China would publicly rebuke Baghdad as well.
138
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Premier Li Peng reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that “China always opposes the invasion of any
country by another force. ‘We are against such things, whether they occur in America, Asia, or
the Middle East.’” And due to the heightened scrutiny over China’s sales to Iraq and Iran during
the 1980s, Li also made a point to assure the world that “China naturally will not sell weapons to
Iraq.” 139
China’s Motivations
First and foremost, China’s cooperation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
regarding the First Iraq War was an attempt to rehabilitate its global image and in particular to
improve its relationship with the United States. Against the backdrop of the 1987 Silkworm
missile sales and the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, Sino-American relations remained frosty. The
sanctions regime imposed against the PRC by the United States was biting, and Chinese leaders
understood that the overarching goal of economic growth could not be achieved without
placating Washington and removing the sanctions. Saddam’s flagrant violation of international
law, then, was a godsend. Not only did Saddam displace the Chinese government in world media
as the most odious global boogeyman, he provided the Chinese government a perfect opportunity
to resurrect its status in the international community. Any multilateral action taken against the
Iraqi government necessitated China’s support: the West was forced to reopen its dialogue with
the Chinese. Thus, U.S. lobbying for Chinese support began the very same day that Iraqi forces
invaded Kuwait and stretched over the following weeks.
Hwei-ling Huo argues that China’s motivations in the First Iraq War should not be
reduced to an attempt to clean up the public relations imbroglio left by the Tiananmen incident.
Instead, Huo contends that China’s cooperation with the international community was evidence
139
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of its acceptance of the New World Order. Far from embracing the idealism that the phrase
suggests, Huo asserts that China’s calculations were rooted in a realistic assessment of its
domestic and foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War world. By 1989, Deng’s economic
policies had resulted in fundamental reforms in the political and social realms as well; to switch
course midstream would yield disastrous results. As both the Tiananmen episode and the cascade
of recent revolutions in the Soviet Union had shown, reform of nondemocratic systems was an
irreversible trend in the world. Both China’s domestic population and its international friends
would inevitably expect change. Chinese leaders, according to Huo, concluded that reform
would have to continue, and that the best way to achieve controlled progress was through
economic development and continued opening up to the outside world. In other words, China
viewed the process of democratizing government and continued economic growth as inextricably
linked. But for either of these long-term development plans to reach fruition, China needed to
ensure an external environment amenable to its reforms. 140 In this way, Chinese participation in
the New World Order reflected a broader, long-term consideration of its future economic and
political interests.
Whether or not this particular argument is compelling, it is clear that China sought to
establish its importance to the international community. As Peking University Professor Wu
Bingbing notes, the Gulf crisis was a platform for China to change its relationship with other
world powers. 141 For example, in November 1990, Foreign Minister Qian held a working
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Xinjiang to discuss the situation
on the Gulf. This was unusual, as high-level bilateral discussions of Middle Eastern issues were a
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rarity in Sino-Soviet relations. 142 More generally, however, the Gulf crisis proved that it was
impossible to achieve a settlement on major international problems without the participation of
the PRC. Thus, a host of different reasons incentivized the Chinese to take part in the multilateral
diplomacy against Saddam Hussein. And although the main goal of improving China’s political
relations with the outside world was at the forefront, participation also served a second goal of
ending U.S. sanctions and continuing economic growth.
China and the United Nations
In total, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed twelve important Security
Council resolutions (SCRs) against Iraq during 1990. While China voted in favor of the first
eleven enforcement resolutions, it abstained on SCR 678, authorizing the use of multilateral
military force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory. The explanation for why China
objected to this resolution in particular, and why it chose to abstain rather than exercise its veto
power, illustrates China’s attempt to avoid alienating either its Arab or Western friends.
Initially, China was eager to participate in the collective decision-making over Iraq,
emphasizing the principles of peace and compliance with international norms. Li Daoyu, the
PRC Ambassador to the UN at the time, indicated that Deng Xiaoping himself set the principles
and guidelines for China’s UN decisions. Deng stressed that first, Iraq must comply with all the
UN Security Council Resolutions, and second, that China would not endorse any proposal to use
armed force to settle the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. 143 The first point highlighted China’s commitment
to respecting and upholding international law, while the second conformed to China’s timehonored Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
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Without exception, China’s voting record on the first eleven SCRs adhered to these
principles. China made a point to speak out against or revise SCR provisions that did not fit
within its framework of peaceful resolution. Since China viewed Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait as
a violation of national and territorial sovereignty, it did not hesitate to vote in favor of SCR 660
condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding its withdrawal on August 2, 1990. Four days later,
China voted in favor of SCR 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. Although China
possessed significant commercial interests in Iraq, these were outweighed by the benefit of
attaining the international community’s goodwill. Still, Li Daoyu made sure to warn his
colleagues on the UNSC against being too hasty in punishing Iraq. After voting in favor of SCR
662 declaring the annexation of Kuwait to be null and void, he again stressed the importance of a
peaceful conclusion to the conflict. Overall, the Chinese leadership was sanguine about the
prospects for success under the framework of the United Nations – so long as all actions were
undertaken with the strictest understanding that force would not be involved. On August 22,
1990, Ambassador Li stated:
“We believe that in order to solve the serious crisis in the Gulf, at present, it is
necessary to seriously and effectively implement these resolutions adopted by the
Security Council…At the same time, China has always in principle opposed
military involvement by big powers…Under the present circumstances, taking
military action will lead to further aggravation of the situation and escalation of
the armed conflict, which cannot help solve the problem. We are concerned about
this.” 144

But beginning with SCR 664, China started to express reservations about the increasingly
forceful language of the draft resolutions being considered in the Security Council. SCR 664
demanded that Iraq permit and facilitate the departure of nationals from third-party countries
within Iraq and Kuwait. The resolution drew its authority from Chapter VII of the United
144
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Nations Charter, which authorizes military and nonmilitary action to restore international peace
and security. Eventually, China voted for the resolution but felt it was inappropriate to cite
Chapter VII, seeing that the treatment of foreign nationals was separate from the broader issue of
invasion. China also insisted on amending SCR 665, which authorized maritime forces in the
Gulf to uphold the economic sanctions “with a minimum use of force.” China objected to this
language, instead proposing that the UNSC only authorize “any such measures commensurate to
the specific circumstances as may be necessary,” as this did not necessarily imply military force.
The draft resolution was passed with China’s amendment on August 25. 145
By November, however, the major states had grown resentful of Saddam’s disregard for
the UN’s collection action and tired of waiting for the sanctions to take effect. A coalition of
member states including the U.S., UK, France, several Arab states, and other member states
deployed forces to Saudi Arabia, laying the groundwork for a full-scale military invasion. In
October 1990, the United States drafted SCR 678, offering Iraq one last chance to comply with
SCR 660, which demanded Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. If Saddam refused, member states
were authorized “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.”
Here, China felt the need to dissociate two issues: the issue of Iraq’s direct aggression against
Kuwait, and the issue of external military intervention. 146
China faced three potential options. First, China could identify with the Iraqi side in the
conflict and exercise its veto power. This, however, would have infuriated the Western powers,
and principally the United States, which had worked extremely diligently to produce this
unprecedented global cooperation on an issue that nearly every nation agreed upon. In addition,
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it would have alienated a swath of Arab countries that feared Iraq’s growing aggressiveness.
Second, China could vote in favor of the U.S.-backed resolution; but this would directly
contradict China’s clearly articulated principle about the non-use of force. In addition, Beijing
felt uncomfortable linking itself with the ambitions of former colonialist powers. China feared
that jumping into bed with such historically strange bedfellows would sully its reputation,
especially in the Middle East, as the lone Third World permanent representative on the UNSC. 147
So, China followed a third path and abstained on the vote. The final tally was twelve in favor,
two against (Cuba and Yemen), and one abstention (China).
Evaluation: China and the First Iraq War
Some scholars, such as Lillian Craig Harris, argue that the Gulf crisis was seriously
detrimental to China’s long-term interests. To start, China suffered immediate economic losses
of $2-3 billion. This resulted in part from losing the earnings and assets of 60 Chinese companies
in Iraq and Kuwait, and a $300 million Kuwaiti development loan, only half of which had been
delivered. In addition, Iraq owed China a significant amount of debt on which payment was
frozen, and the war forced the halt of several major development projects in both countries. 148
China was also forced to undertake the evacuation of some 10,000 workers from both countries
through Jordan. 149
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Harris also suggests that China suffered major diplomatic losses as a result of the war,
particularly with respect to Middle Eastern regimes. Despite China’s abstention on SCR 678,
Harris notes that Arab regimes were not completely fooled by China’s careful politicking. On the
one hand, China was now at risk of appearing to be yet another bully exercising control over
Middle Eastern countries through economic and technical aid. China’s participation in the UN
during the First Iraq War may have fostered its reputation as being in a de facto alliance with the
West. On the other hand, China’s unwillingness to support the use of force against Iraq (a
country feared by many other regimes in the Gulf) drew the displeasure of other Gulf regimes
such as Egypt and Kuwait. Since in their view China could not be counted upon to assist its Arab
friends, China was shut out of consultations on the post-crisis Gulf security arrangements and all
but excluded from involvement in forthcoming Kuwait reconstruction projects. 150
It is unclear, however, that these short-term economic and diplomatic losses outweighed
the long-term gains China reaped as a result of the First Iraq War. True, China suffered a
significant financial setback in the immediate aftermath of the invasion to the invasion. But its
willingness to participate in Western-led collective action went a long way toward rehabilitating
its public image and restoring the conditions for economic progress that existed before the
Tiananmen disaster. Even before voting on SCR 678, Western Europe was so pleased with
China’s participation on the first eleven enforcement resolutions that it lifted the economic
sanctions against China. Meanwhile, by the end of December, Japan resumed loans and financial
assistance that had been held up after the Tiananmen incident. And despite tough Congressional
opposition, Washington ultimately approved China’s Most-Favored-Nation trading status. 151
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Nor is it clear that the Gulf War took as great a toll on China’s diplomatic relations as
Harris asserts. To the extent that China’s relationship with Iraq and other Gulf regimes were hurt
as a result of the war, a couple of qualifications are in order. First, China maintained open
dialogue with Middle Eastern regimes during the entirety of the crisis. The PRC did all within its
power to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis in the lead up to SCR 678, and it
was one of few countries to dispatch an emissary to the Middle East after Iraq’s invasion in
August. From November 6-12, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, and Iraq – the purpose of Qian’s visit was “to explore with leaders of those countries the
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis.” 152 In this capacity, the Chinese were able
to actively engage with the region. In serving as an intermediary between Iraq and the West, the
Chinese promoted dialogue and acted as a messenger. 153 Second, any economic backlash that
China suffered was short-term in nature. As the next section will show, China’s bilateral
relationships with Gulf countries expanded after 1992, when China’s need for oil from the region
began to benefit from its policy of steadfast neutrality.
Perhaps more importantly, China was able to accomplish its principal goal of restoring its
relationship with the United States. During Qian’s November trip to the Middle East, for
example, he had the opportunity to meet with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Cairo to
discuss the possibility of China’s support for military action. 154 Qian claimed that the meeting
was “conducive to improving relations between China and the United States.” 155 And in
exchange for not wielding its veto on UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 678, Beijing
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requested and was granted a meeting between Qian and President Bush in December. This was
the first time that a senior Chinese official had been invited to the White House since the ban on
contact imposed shortly after the Tiananmen incident. 156 The First Iraq War had required
important bilateral dialogue and suggested that Sino-U.S. cooperation was integral to the New
World Order.
CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY
China’s Growing Energy Needs
During most of the latter half of the twentieth century, China relied on domestic
production to satisfy its energy needs. In fact, it had been a net exporter of oil since the SinoSoviet split in 1960. The initial period of Sino-Soviet comity preceding the split provided many
benefits to China. Among these were Soviet technological advisors and large-scale cooperation
in the energy sector. Indeed, China was dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 50% of its
critical refined oil products during the 1950s. 157 But when Sino-Soviet relations ground to a halt
in 1960, the Kremlin withdrew its advisors from China’s oil sector. Although the PRC continued
to import products from the Soviet Union following the split, it prioritized self-sufficiency in oil
as a goal to ensure energy security thereafter.
After 1978, China expanded production of low technology, labor-intensive consumer
goods that had been more or less ignored under the state-planned economy. The fastest growing
sectors during the 1980s and 1990s were labor-intensive light manufacturing powered by
township and village enterprises. Overall the introduction of competition between state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and the nascent private sector inevitably made energy cost management a
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relevant factor in the production of goods. 158 As the Chinese economy rapidly expanded toward
the close of the century, energy demand skyrocketed, as did the energy intensity of economic
output. 159 This phenomenon can be attributed to the growth of China’s energy-intensive heavy
industry sector following Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up policy. The PRC’s financial system has
tended to favor the heavy industrialization sector because operating costs are low, excess
capacity can be exported without inducing normal exchange rate effects, and risk is low since
borrowers are mostly state-owned firms. In addition, China has preferred to self-produce, rather
than import, energy-intensive basic products such as steel and aluminum used to construct roads
and buildings requisite for its infrastructural development. 160 These factors contributed to the
explosive rise in energy intensity during the 1990s. 161
The year 1993 marked a turning point in Chinese energy policy as China once again
returned to being a net importer of crude oil. During 1996, the shortfall between Chinese oil
consumption and production was approximately 400,000 barrels per day. The gap between
China’s domestic oil production and its consumption continued to grow and is predicted to widen
over time; by 2020 it is projected to rise to 5.2 million barrels per day (Fig. 5). 162
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Fig. 5 - China’s Demand for Oil Imports, 1996-2020

Source: Erica Strecker Downs, China's Quest for Energy Security, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000).

From 1992 to 1997, China’s oil material and equipment exports to the Middle East grew 710
times. 163 As the Middle East contains the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, the region’s
increasing importance to Chinese strategic interests is obvious.
In addressing its growing oil needs, China has focused more on supply-side security than
on moderating demand. In other words, the PRC has emphasized ensuring the free flow of oil to
support its burgeoning economy, rather than voluntarily slowing down the well-performing
heavy industry sector. Still, Beijing has realized the perils of tethering the country’s oil supply to
the international market. Sudden increases in international oil prices can often have disastrous
effects on a country’s domestic economy. For example, changes in oil prices – and in particular
quick spikes – can cause domestic inflation, rising interest rates, slackened economic demand,
163
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and high unemployment. 164 Oil shocks have the potential to dramatically set back the PRC’s
economic development, since as a developing nation, China is especially vulnerable to price
fluctuations. Additionally, Beijing’s distrust of regular energy markets derives in part from the
perception that these markets are dominated by the United States. China lacks the naval
capabilities to competently secure the global sea-lines of communication through which most
crude oil travels. As such, it must “free ride” on American protection of oil supply lines. And
even though the United States is the most important guarantor of free oil flow, it is also a
potential adversary for China. 165 This puts China in the awkward position of depending on its
strategic competitor for energy security. Beijing’s unease is compounded by the fear that the
United States will exploit China’s need for energy as a weakness in the event of a future SinoAmerican conflict. 166
The belief among CCP leadership that energy security can best be achieved through
control of supplies rather than through participation in a secure international market has given
rise to China’s “equity oil strategy.” This strategy essentially entails buying oil and oil
infrastructure across the world with the intention of diverting those resources from the world
market for domestic consumption. 167 Functionally, this requires owning both the oilfields
themselves, as well as the transport networks that facilitate the resource’s return to China.
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China’s National Owned Companies (NOCs) have played a crucial role in this equity oil
strategy. NOCs such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Chinese National
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)
produce, import, trade, and process oil. They are also the entities that enter into exploration and
production contracts in other nations on behalf of Beijing. By acquiring equity stakes in oil
contracts, particularly in the Persian Gulf, the NOCs allow the Chinese government to have
direct control over oil supply from the Middle East.
The purchase of equity interests in Middle Eastern oilfields yields several advantages
over buying oil off the international market. 168 First, buying equity barrels can eliminate market
price risk by enabling the investor to predict precisely how much oil it will receive and at what
cost over the life of the oilfield. Second, equity oil in the long-term can provide the buyer with a
much lower price than the market price. As an equity owner, the buyer is able to produce and
transport oil well below the market-clearing price. Third, equity ownership eliminates the need
for middlemen such as other companies. This ultimately saves money and precludes the risk of
the middleman cutting off supply. Theoretically, then, China’s direct access to oil under the
equity strategy offers both stable oil flow and prices, even in the case of oil supply or price
shocks affecting the rest of the international market. 169

168

For a detailed analysis of the economics underlying equity oil and oversees investment, see Downs,
“The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” 35.
169
Whether or not equity oil strategy actually enhances energy security is a matter of debate. For one, the
huge gap between China’s equity supply and import demand indicates that it will be impossible for China
to rely solely on equity oil to satisfy its needs. In fact, China will have to increasingly rely on the
international market in the future, making it more – not less – dependent on foreign oil. Additionally, this
strategy has antagonized China’s neighbors and competitors by giving the impression that China’s NOCs
are somehow “hogging” the oil and thereby reducing the total share available to the rest of the market.
See Giljum, “The Future of China’s Energy Security,” 17.

Lee |

75

Chinese Oil Security and Iraq
After the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the United States maintained and
enforced sanctions against Iraq. The most severe of these prohibited Iraqi oil exports. Chinese
officials continuously called upon Iraq to comply fully with any UN resolutions, but they also
expressed strong reservations about the efficacy of the ongoing sanctions regime. Many
international commentators in 1995 declaimed the declining humanitarian condition of Iraq,
attributing widespread hunger and unemployment to a U.S.-led sanctions regimen that was doing
more harm to the average Iraqi citizen than to Saddam’s government. China applauded President
Bill Clinton’s introduction of the UN Oil-for-Food Program (OFF), which permitted Iraq to sell
limited amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and other basic necessities (billions in
revenue was corruptly siphoned away from state coffers). Although Sino-Iraqi trade was minimal
following the First Iraq War, it rose dramatically by the end of the 1990s due to this program.
After OFF commenced in December 1996, China actively pursued oil and construction contracts
with Iraq. In 1996, China’s total exports to and imports from Iraq were valued at only $1.15
million. By 1997, China’s total volume of trade with Iraq increased by $92 million dollars, and
peaked at $517 million in 2002 (See App. 3). 170 Not satisfied with limited importation of these
resources, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Qin Huasen emphatically expressed in
May 1996 China’s hope that the UN Security Council would go a step further and,
evaluate Iraq’s efforts to implement related resolutions of the UN Security Council in an
objective and fair manner, gradually eliminate sanctions in accordance with the progress
of Iraq’s implementation of the UN resolutions, and, first of all, remove the sanction of
oil export by Iraq. 171
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One way to view Beijing’s encouragement of lifting the UN sanctions is through a
humanitarian lens. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated, China may have been
legitimately concerned with “easing the suffering of the Iraqi people from sanctions.” 172 Another
way is to contextualize Beijing’s actions with respect to its broader goal of achieving regional
stability for China’s own economic growth. China’s interest in Iraq was a fairly straightforward
matter, given China’s budding need for oil and Iraq’s title to the second largest crude oil reserves
in the Middle East. China hoped that agitating for the free flow of Iraqi oil would generate
another petroleum market to fuel China’s economic growth.
In June 1997, a consortium of Chinese oil companies represented by CNPC and China
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), a major arms sales agent of the Chinese government,
signed a 22-year production-sharing contract with Iraq. 173 Beijing was anxious to include
Baghdad in its equity oil enterprise, even though most of the First Iraq War sanctions would
remain in force until 2003. Under the agreement, China was to help develop Iraq’s Al-Ahdab oil
field once sanctions were lifted. Al-Ahdab is Iraq’s second largest oilfield, boasting estimated
recoverable reserves of 1.4 billion barrels. CNPC and NORINCO formed a new company, alWaha, to develop the field; combined, the consortium owned 50% equity in the project. 174
Simultaneously, Beijing held negotiations aimed at signing concessions on at least three other
oilfields. Together, China’s 50% share in their combined output could supply China with
approximately half its annual oil imports in that year alone. 175 Liberating Iraqi oil was a step
toward producing the regional stability requisite for Chinese economic growth, as evidenced by
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MFA spokesman Cui’s wish that “the problems left by the Gulf Crisis [be] resolved as quickly as
possible, and that peace and stability in the Gulf area can be realized at an early date.” 176
Unfortunately for Beijing, progress on the 1997 Al-Ahdab oil project would be stymied by
America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq in the Second Iraq War. As the next section will show, China
subjugated its interest in oil and by extension economic stability to its interest in placating the
United States.
THE SECOND IRAQ WAR (2003-2012)
Background: Caught Between Iraq and a Hard Place
The ceasefire forged after the 1990 Gulf War was brittle at best. It was not a treaty, but a
multilateral settlement artificially created by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Saddam Hussein’s persistent truculence in the face of the UN peacekeeping sanctions passed
after the 1990 Gulf War was a sobering reminder of the New World Order’s ineffectiveness.
The issue of Iraqi weapons and UN weapons inspections continued to stymie progress
and contributed significantly to the advent of the Second Iraq War. Saddam already had a history
of employing chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). His military inflicted mass
casualties against its enemies through these means during the Iran-Iraq War, in one famous
instance called the “Anfal,” or spoils of war, campaign killing somewhere from 50,000 to
100,000 Iranians. 177 In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed SCR 687,
ordering Iraq to destroy its chemical and biological weapons and reaffirming SCR 661’s
imposition of economic sanctions. The resolution also created the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to monitor Iraqi disarmament. During the course of
176
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investigation, UNSCOM unearthed astonishing evidence of Iraq’s significant investments in
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Saddam caused a global crisis in August 1998 when
he shut down UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspections. In
response, the United States Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, calling for containment and
regime change in Iraq. Tensions ratcheted up in 1999 when the Iraqi military fired anti-aircraft
artillery and missiles at U.S. and British planes in the no-fly zones operated in northern and
southern Iraq. Altogether, the collapse of the weapons inspections regime, Saddam’s undoing of
the carefully wrought economic sanctions, and his military challenge to the no-fly zones
undermined American containment policy and convinced Washington that Saddam was a threat
to U.S. national security. 178
Meanwhile, the PRC continued to insist on the principle of the non-use of force in
resolving the worsening U.S.-Iraqi dispute. Qin Huasen stated that the United States’ unilateral
military strikes in the no-fly zone represented “a worrying trend” about the “willful use of force,
especially unilateral actions taken without the Council’s authorization.” 179 Then came the 9/11
terrorist attack against the United States in 2001, which left America vulnerable and profoundly
altered Washington’s conception of national security. Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks,
Saddam’s refusal to disavow possession of nuclear weapons along with mistaken intelligence
pointing to Iraq’s harboring of Al Qaeda operatives looked damning. The United States was
poised for war. With obligations to both ensuring its economic interests and supporting the
United States during this time of need, Beijing was caught between conflicting foreign policy
interests.
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Beijing’s Balancing Act
The Second Iraq War proved to be a fundamentally different creature from the Iran-Iraq
and First Iraq Wars for China. Several factors militated against any Chinese endorsement of
President Bush’s Second Iraq War. To begin with, China’s economic involvement in the Persian
Gulf was never more indispensible to its modernization campaign. Arms sales, labor export, and
construction had all declined and were replaced by the all-consuming importance of oil. 180 The
prospect of an American invasion threatened China’s over $7 billion obligations in Iraq, and in
particular oil contracts valued at over $1 billion; the resulting rise in oil prices could have deep
economic ramifications in the mainland. 181 In addition, Beijing now occupied a fresh position in
the international community. The ghost of Tiananmen had faded, and China was now an
emerging – and even respected – economic, military, and political power. As the First Iraq War
showed, Beijing had painstakingly sought to assure the world community that it was a
responsible stakeholder, just as it tried to establish its integrity in the Middle East through a
reputation of non-interference.
Nevertheless, Beijing’s hand was practically forced due to its ever-present Post-Cold War
interest in currying favor, or at least avoiding the ire, of the United States. The circumstances
that generated the Second Iraq War provided a rationale for Chinese support from a security
standpoint, too, as the United States’ initial premise for invasion was the threat of Iraqi WMDs.
China may have found this rationale more palatable than the human rights issues raised when the
United States intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 90s. 182 More importantly, Beijing was
at pains to repair the Sino-U.S. relationship in light of the strained tone it had assumed at the turn
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of the millennium. The collision of an American reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet
caused a diplomatic crisis in 2001. Then, when President Bush enumerated “rogue states” in his
early national security speeches, many analysts inferred that the administration was implicitly
suggesting China was the backer of these regimes. Additionally, a classified U.S. Nuclear
Posture Review leaked to the press in 2002 identified China as one of seven possible targets of
nuclear attack by the United States. The Bush Administration’s aggressive new posture of
preemptive warfare under the Bush Doctrine further elicited Beijing’s fears. 183 In this context,
China could ill-afford to earn the wrath of a vulnerable and war-hungry Washington.
Yitzhak Shichor believes that Beijing may even have quietly welcomed the U.S.-led
military intervention because it believed (mistakenly) that the crisis would the quickest and least
disruptive way to solve the problem of Saddam Hussein’s intransigence. China was now
considerably dependent on Gulf oil and especially eager to see regional and economic stability to
further its economic growth. Saddam’s temperamental control over Iraq’s oil exportations
coupled with the alarm he aroused in other littoral states in the Gulf were far from ideal. 184
Given the United States’ stunning display of military superiority in the First Iraq War, It was
reasonable to think that Second War could restore order relatively quickly and painlessly.
Although the Chinese preferred peaceful multilateral action, if the United States was determined
to invade, then swift action was preferable from an economic perspective. 185
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American military forces invaded Iraq in 2003. This time, Washington sidestepped the
United Nations Security Council in order to minimize the ability other nations’ ability to water
down the war effort. Chinese actions in the wake of the invasion bear out the notion that its
policy was a careful balancing act between salvaging its own interests and avoiding antagonizing
the United States. Seeing the conflict was unavoidable, China frantically prepared for the
economic consequences to come. In the month prior to the outbreak of war, China increased its
oil imports, principally from Africa and Russia, by over 2/3 in comparison to the previous
year. 186 China also created a National Energy Commission to design a national energy and oil
security plan, to adjust the structures of national energy production and consumption, and to map
out a plan to reduce reliance on foreign crude oil and natural gas. 187
Beijing sought to avoid confrontation with Washington by taking a very measured tone in
publicly addressing the American action in the Gulf. It did not add its voice to the FrenchRussian-German joint statement issued on February 24, 2003 balking at the American invasion.
Instead, Beijing harnessed this opportunity to stress the importance of multilateral dialogue on
the issue. This was in line with the Chinese government’s general trend toward encouraging
greater UN involvement in Iraq throughout the 90s, including both the First Iraq War and the
WMD fiasco. Despite China’s historical reluctance to participate in the UN, Chinese Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan was remarkably busy in early 2003, making four trips to the UN to lobby
for a political resolution to the Iraq conflict. China even voted in favor of SCR 1546, legitimizing
the presence of U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping forces in Iraq. Last, official Chinese
opprobrium of U.S. actions in Iraq was moderate. Most criticism was restricted to skepticism
regarding America’s attempt to democratize the Middle East. While some newspapers opined
186
187

Mao, “Beijing’s Two Pronged Iraq Policy.”
Shichor, “Decisionmaking in Triplicate,” 213.

From Beijing to Baghdad | 82

that U.S. military action was a violation of international law and the UN charter, many also
characterized the U.S. role in Iraq as one of safeguarding the new Iraqi government and helping
train army officers and policemen. 188
Evaluation: China and the Second Iraq War
As was the case with the First Iraq War, China suffered some immediate economic harm
in the aftermath of the Second Iraq War. In the first four months of 2003 – the year of the
American invasion – Chinese oil imports grew by 42.9%, but its payments rose by 110.6% per
year, resulting in extra costs of about $4 billion. The war also disrupted the progress of more
than 100 projects with Chinese participation underway in the MENA region, while affecting tens
of thousands of contract workers. Additionally, the three Iraqi oil concession projects mentioned
above were put on hold. 189
Still, China was able to achieve substantial long-term gains from the Second Iraq War.
Beijing was prudent in restraining its criticism of the U.S.-led war effort. As a result, the PRC
was not placed on the U.S. list of countries (which included Russia, France, and Germany)
excluded from bidding on reconstruction projects in Iraq. 190 Beijing pledged $25 million to the
reconstruction effort and agreed to forgive a large part of Iraq’s multi-billion dollar outstanding
debt in an attempt to improve its goodwill and to earn tangible benefits from the new
government. In fact, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Shen Guofang stated explicitly that China
forgave the debt owned by Saddam’s regime for the purpose of gaining access to the bidding
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processes on big oil and infrastructure projects. 191 These overtures were well received. In
November 2008, CNPC signed a Developing Service Contract with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and
resumed development on the Al-Ahdab Oilfield, the concession originally agreed upon in 1997.
In 2009, CNPC joined with BP to win the operating rights to the Rumaila Oilfield. Rumaila
boasts oil reserves of about 17 billion barrels, and is Iraq’s largest oilfield and the sixth largest
oilfield in the world. That same year also witnessed CPNC’s joint venture with Total and
Petronas in winning the contract for Halfaya Oilfield in southern Iraq. 192 By 2013, China was
jointly operating three fields in the south of Iraq, in total producing 1.4 million barrels per day –
more than half Iraq’s output. 193
The Second Iraq War also offered China less tangible benefits. The United States’
miscalculation and prolonged presence in the Middle Eastern country seemingly confirmed the
prudence of Beijing’s non-interference doctrine. The Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo
took America’s abject failure in Iraq as a lesson against involving China in the internal politics of
other countries. The Second Iraq War was also beneficial to China insofar as China has a
strategic interest in the decline of U.S. power. The United States’ distraction in Iraq limited the
opportunity for it to implement an anti-China containment policy. 194 More broadly, the War
distracted American attention and resources, drove the U.S. into further financial distress, eroded
American credibility with allies, and stained America’s international image. Militarily, the Iraq
War gave Beijing the opportunity to witness an even more extensive display of American
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military technology and provided it with insight into the nature of highly information-intensive
modern warfare. 195
CONCLUSION
China’s political and economic circumstances changed rapidly during the 90s and into the
2000s. Despite this dazzling transformation, United States has remained an omnipresent
consideration in Middle East foreign policymaking. The First and Second Iraq Wars amply
demonstrate Beijing’s resolve to move forward with its modernization policies, but not at the
cost of antagonizing Washington. Thus, China’s conception of stability in the Post-Cold War
Period has been centered on the pursuit of two main interests: economic growth in the form of oil
and maintaining healthy relations with the United States.
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V. FINAL CONCLUSION
In half a century, the foundation of Chinese Iraq policy migrated from Bandung to barrels
of oil. Along the way, China’s ideological and practical interests changed rapidly. The Sino-Iraqi
relationship reflected these changes – from direct partnership, to outright antagonism, to
calculated but friendly neutrality. But that does not mean Chinese policy in Iraq was erratic or
haphazard. Far from it, the PRC’s approach to the Republic of Iraq exhibits an internally
consistent logic, merely adjusting in response to China’s evolving domestic needs and
international ambitions.
Central to this logic is the PRC’s status as a relatively “weak” power. Compared to
countries like the United States, the PRC has historically lacked the political and economic clout
to mold conditions in the Middle East to suit its needs. In the absence of this power, China’s
Middle East policy has thus been aimed at ensuring regional stability in manner consistent with
China’s interests. The precise definition of regional stability has varied almost decade by decade,
and this paper has identified a paradigm for analyzing these evolving foreign policy trends over
three different periods. During each period, China’s ideological, economic, and strategic
considerations resulted in a specific understanding of “stability.”
During the Cold War Period (1958-1979), China’s primary foes were the United States
and later the Soviet Union. Beijing’s understanding of regional stability entailed preventing the
further geographic encroachment of either superpower into the Middle East. Iraq served as a
“Cold War” battleground that the Chinese attempted to wean from superpower control. Beijing
initially hailed the founding of the Republic of Iraq in 1958 and commenced trade and extended
economic assistance to enhance its political relationship with the country. During the 1960s,
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however, the bilateral relationship soured as a series of new Iraqi regimes sought closer ties to
the superpowers. The latter half of the 1970s saw a renewed energy in Sino-Iraqi relations, and
China inaugurated a host of construction and labor projects that promoted goodwill between both
nations. Chinese economic aid and cooperation with Iraq during this time served the purpose of
enhancing the political relationship, with the ultimate goal of hedging against the superpowers.
The Transition Period (1980-1988) challenged the previous definition of stability by
pitting China’s interest in combating the superpowers against its interests in economic growth.
China publicly discouraged both belligerents of the Iran-Iraq War from fighting, alleging that
their confrontation opened the door to superpower intervention. On the other hand, China
concluded approximately $9.4 billion in arms transfer agreements with both countries from
1981-1988, playing a crucial role in prolonging the war. These actions highlight Beijing’s
gradual prioritization of its economic interests over its fear of superpower hegemony. This
“transition” in priorities is the namesake of The Transition Period.
Finally, the Post-Cold War Period (1989-present) exhibits China’s almost exclusively
utilitarian definition of stability: the free flow of oil to fuel domestic economic growth. And
despite China’s remarkable economic progress since the 1980s, the two Iraq Wars during this
last Period also demonstrate China’s need to maintain good relations with the United States and
the international community. China’s neutrality with respect to the American invasions in Iraq
during 1990 and 2003 reveals real and continuing limitations on China’s ability to shape events
in the region.
The future direction of Chinese Iraq policy – and China’s broader Middle East policy – is
uncertain. If this project’s findings are any indication, then it is clear that China’s interests in the
Middle East are constantly in flux. Thus, China’s current Post-Cold War approach is unlikely to

Lee |

87

remain as is. On the one hand, it is possible that the world’s increasingly scarce resources
coupled with China’s explosive economic and population growth will generate future
competition with other nations, and in particular with the United States. If that is the case, then
China’s good relations with Middle Eastern nations, rooted in their shared Third World heritage,
may give it the upper hand as a competitor for Gulf oil. But there is also reason for optimism.
China’s consistent emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in conducting affairs
with the Middle East is a matter of record. More importantly, the two Iraq Wars, and even
China’s respective abstention in the UN votes on Libya in 2011 and its veto against UN
resolutions to intervene in Syria, indicate a preference for communicating and working through
multilateral institutions to deal with Middle East crises. By word and by deed, the Chinese have
expressed their determination to participate in the international community as responsible
stakeholders.
Ultimately, the People’s Republic of China will continue to emphasize regional stability,
although the definitional nuances of that word may change. As China continues to develop, we
can expect that it will more forcefully assert the principle of nonintervention in the event of
future Middle East crises. And with respect to the prospects for Sino-Iraqi relations, the future is
indeed bright. Both Iraq’s economic and political situation and relationship to China are likely to
improve as it recovers from the legacy of American occupation and develops its oil infrastructure
and human capital. What we can expect, then, will be the abundant flow of goods and services,
collaboration and cooperation, from Beijing to Baghdad, and back.
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VI. APPENDICES
Appendix 1 – Key Abbreviations

CCP
CIA
CNOOC
CNPC
ICP
IMF
IAEA
KMT
MENA
MFA
NCNA
NOC
NORINCO
NPC
OFF
PLA
PRC
SCR
SIPRI
UAR
UN
UNSC
US
USSR
WMD

Chinese Communist Party
Central Intelligence Agency
China National Offshore Oil Company
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
Iraqi Communist Party
International Monetary Fund
International Atomic Energy Agency
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
Middle East North Africa
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
New China News Agency
National Owned Companies
China North Industries Corporation
National People’s Congress
UN Oil-for-Food Program
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Republic of China
Security Council Resolution
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
United Arab Republic
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
United States
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Weapons of mass destruction
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Appendix 2 - Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons from China to Iraq, 1980-1988

Recipient
(R)

China
R: Iraq

#
delivered/
produced

Weapon
designation

Weapon
description

Year
of
order

(1000)

WZ-120/Type-59

Tank

(1981) 1982-1987

(1000)

(650)

YW-531/Type-63

APC

(1981) 1982-1988

(650)

Incl some YW-701 CP version

F-6/Farmer

Fighter aircraft

(1982) 1982-1983

(40)

Delivered via Egypt and Jordan

WZ-121/Type-69

Tank

(1982) 1983-1987

(1500)

F-7A

Fighter aircraft

1983

1983-1987

(90)

Type-63 107mm

Towed MRL

(1983) 1984-1988

(100)

# ordered

40
(1500)
(90)

(100)

Year(s) of
deliveries

Comments

No. delivered could be between 250 and
1300

Type-69-I and Type-69-II version
F-7B version; assembled in Egypt and
transferred via
Jordan; no. could be up to 100
Probably assembled or produced in Iraq

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
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Appendix 3 – China’s Exports to and Imports from Iraq (value in millions of US dollars)

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Total
135.72
158.32
76.67
63.78
94.74
79.52
0.36
1.27
5.52
2.42
0.91
1.15
93.20
164.53
264.07
974.90
469.99
517.06
56.38
46.98
82.40

Export
133.05
155.08
73.45
63.78
60.91
33.64
0.08
0.67
4.87
1.55
0.30
1.04
58.98
104.67
147.95
327.26
396.97
420.82
56.06
14.94
40.80

Import
2.67
3.24
3.22
0
33.80
45.88
0.28
0.60
0.65
1.07
0.61
0.11
34.22
59.86
116.12
647.64
73.02
96.24
0.32
32.05
41.60

Source: Steve A. Yetiv, and Chunlong Lu, "China, Global Energy, and the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 61, no. 2 (2007): 199218.
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